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INTRODUCTION
We say "products liability" rather than manufacturer's liabili-
ty,2 seller's liability,3 commercial seller's liability,4 business
2. This locution is favored in two states. Alabama law substitutes the "Alabama
Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine," frequently abbreviated "AEMLD," for prod-
ucts liability. See Vines v. Beloit Corp., 631 So. 2d 1003, 1004 (Ala. 1994); Volkswagen
of Am. v. Marinelli, 628 So. 2d 378, 380 (Ala. 1993); see also Edward C. Martin,
Alabama's Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (AEMLD), 13 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 983, 990-98 (1990) (outlining Alabama approach, which seeks to meld strict
liability and negligence principles). Oklahoma caselaw and jury instructions refer to
"manufacturer's liability" as a cause of action. See Slaton v. Vansickle, 872 P.2d 929, 930
(Okla. 1994); Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 845 P.2d 187, 188 (Okla. 1992). Unlike
other alternatives to "products liability," however, "manufacturer's liability" does not
enjoy significant support in the literature.
3. Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts imposes strict liability in tort on
"[o]ne who sells." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
4. The phrase "commercial seller" appears in the current draft revision of § 402A
of the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIA-
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supplier's liability,5 producer's liability,6 or any other alternative
phrase referring to persons, even though inanimate objects are un-
able to pay money judgments. One of the very few defining criter-
ia of a "products liability" case is a person-defendant who engages
regularly in a particular business activity,7 but in the language
Americans use, we blame the thing. This vernacular oddity pro-
vokes the argument that products liability is a phrase without
sense.
8
From there one can readily say that it ought not to exist.9
Only a person can be liable, critics have written, and thus the
term "products liability" functions simply to obstruct well-devel-
BILITY, § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) [hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT].
5. See JERRY J. PHILLIPS El AL, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES, MATERIALS,
PROBLEMS 14-15 (1994) (offering a proposed alternative to § 402A called "Special Liabil-
ity of the Business Supplier of a Defective Product").
6. The term "producer" is favored in Europe. See, e.g., Council Directive 85/374 of
25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Provi-
sions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 1985 O.J. (L
210) 29 (introducing European law providing for "liability without fault on the part of
the producer"). The dominant Italian translation of products liability is responsabilitd del
produttore. See GUIDO ALPA ET AL., LA RESPONSABILITA DEL PRODUTTORE 1 n.*
(1989).
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1965). Elements com-
monly found in products liability cases that are not necessary in all jurisdictions for the
products-liability designation include (1) a "sale," see McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, 416
S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1987) (free sample to prospective customer); (2) a "defect," see
Smith v. Detroit Marine Eng'g Corp., 712 S.W.2d 472, 475 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (revers-
ing judgment for defendant because the trial judge had instructed the jury that the prod-
uct must have been both defective and unreasonably dangerous; according to the appel-
late court, either showing by plaintiff would suffice); (3) an "unreasonably dangerous"
product, see id; see also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Cal. 1972)
(allowing recovery after finding that product was defective but not unreasonably danger-
ous); (4) a harmful condition that the defendant could have prevented, see Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (NJ. 1982) (imposing liability for failure
to warn even though plaintiff did not allege that risks were known or knowable at the
time of distribution); and (5) damage to persons or property, see Board of Educ. of
Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 596-603 (Ill. 1989) (discussing "products
liability" claim for costs of asbestos abatement mandated by statute).
8. See J.A. Jolowicz, Product Liability in the EEC, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ON HIS SEVENTI-
ETH BIRTHDAY 369, 370-76 (David S. Clark ed., 1990); Grant Gilmore, Products Lia-
bility: A Commentary, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 103, 115-16 (1970).
9. For expressions of this argument, see William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to
Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL L. REV. 639; Malcolm Wheeler, The Need
for Narrow Tort Reform: Abolishing Strict Product Liability, in PRODUCr LIABILITY RE-
FORM: DEBATING THE ISSUEs 23 (Kenneth L. Chilton ed., 1990); see also David Griffith,
Products Liability-Negligence Presumed: An Evolution, 12 J. PROD. LIAB. 201 (1989) (ar-
guing that products liability restates negligence).
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oped legal principles: warranty, misrepresentation, sales law, and,
most important, negligence. The attempt to isolate some kind of
"strict liability in tort" for the harms caused by products has re-
sulted in confusion. Regardless of what legal claim she brings, goes
this critique, the plaintiff is always alleging either tortious conduct
on the part of the seller or breach of some assurance such as a
warranty. Courts have drawn a line at true strict liability. Most
judges say that they will refuse to impose liability without defect,
liability for risks unknowable at the time of manufacture, and ge-
neric or product-category liability." Fault-based defenses such as
comparative negligence are usually allowed in products liability ac-
tions." Thus, products liability as a doctrine-independent of tort
and contract law-is said to be without content. 2
Other observers regard the invention of products liability as a
judicial attempt to effect distributive justice and achieve the fa-
mous "policy bases" of products liability: loss spreading or com-
pensation, risk shifting, incentives to safety, and cost internaliza-
tion. These labels and others are frequently used to describe the
hope that stricter liability will make products safer, and also pro-
tect consumers with insurance against the risks or harms that al-
ways inhere in mass-marketed products. 3 A voluminous literature
attacks this vision of distribution, which is generally credited to
Justice Roger Traynor and two of his celebrated judicial opin-
ions.'4 A smaller literature defends it.' 5 Economic analysts de-
10. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Prod-
ucts Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263,
1263-76 (1991); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword.- Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL L.
REv. 435, 493-96 (1979).
11. See infra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
12. A British scholar catalogues some omissions:
[A]vailable theory is unable satisfactorily to explain, let alone justify, the exclu-
sion of pure economic loss claims, the restriction of the rule to products, and
to products which have been put into commercial circulation .... Similarly,
there is only thin and unsatisfactory treatment of why the rules contain a "de-
fect" requirement.
JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIABILITY 351 (1994).
13. See Mark Geistfeld, Implementing Enterprise Liability: A Comment on Henderson
and Twersk4 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1157, 1160 (1992) (adding that safety and insurance
functions cannot both efficiently be served by enterprise liability rule).
14. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962); Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). Impor-
tant attacks on the Traynor vision include PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 36-44 (1988) [hereinafter HUBER, LIABILITY];
George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY: PERSPEC-
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bate whether stricter liability, which they now often call "enter-
prise liability," offers any promise.1 Regardless of the merits of
Traynor's weltanschauung, however, products liability is generally
understood on his terms.'7 When the subject became overtly po-
TIVES AND POLICY 184, 222 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford L. Winston eds., 1988) (gather-
ing empirical data to argue that little improvement in safety is attributable to products
liability law); Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 3. LEGAL
STUD. 645, 664-69 (1985) (alluding to manufacturer's difficulties in obtaining insurance);
Peter W. Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in
the Courts, 85 COLUM. L REV. 277, 307-29 (1985) [hereinafter Huber, Safety] (arguing
that expanded liability decreases safety); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis
and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1521, 1525 (1987) (arguing that insurance function
of products liability is a failure) [hereinafter Priest, Current Insurance Crisis]. In addition
to these criticisms from the right, Traynor's approach has been attacked as too conserva-
tive because it assumes that injury can be remedied by the payment of money, and be-
cause it does not aspire to change existing distributions of power between sellers and
victims. See Richard L. Abel, The R6l Torts Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
443 (1987); Leslie Bender, Feminist Re(Torts): Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass
Torts, Power and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE LJ. 848. Other significant criticisms include
H. Patrick Glenn, Judicial Authority and the Liability of the Manufacturer, or Jusqu'od .
Peut-on Aller Trop Loin?, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 555, 564-65 (1990) (expressing skepticism
about the beneficial outcomes promised by strict products liability); Ernest J. Weinrib,
Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37, 59-61 (1977) (question-
ing whether strict liability can be consistent with corrective justice).
15. Traynor's own defense of his products liability vision is Roger W. Traynor, The
Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 366
(1965) (arguing that a manufacturer is "best able to anticipate and bear the risks of inju-
ries from defective products"). Consumer advocates and the organized plaintiffs' bar have
applauded stricter liability, arguing that its ambitions regarding safety and insurance have
succeeded. See THE ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, QUICK FACTS ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW TO PROTECT CONSUMERS 2 (1994)
[hereinafter QUICK FACTS]; CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, BENEFITS OF THE
MODERNIZATION OF THE TORT LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR
IMPROVED SAFETY AND QUALITY IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY (1987); Joan Claybrook,
The Consumer Stake in Product Liability, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1178 (Feb.
20, 1991).
16. The range of opinion among mainstream economic analysts runs from W. Kip
Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government "Regu-
lation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65 (1989)
(arguing that an optimal mix of risk-reduction systems requires a diminished role for the
tort system) to Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived
Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1993) (arguing for enterprise liability
as a solution to market failures). Although it is unclear whether their conclusions are
driven by their models or by pragmatic deference to present doctrinal reality, most eco-
nomic analysts accept a centrist position: Optimal accident reduction, they argue, exists in
a legal regime of relatively strict products liability combined with vigorous plaintiffs-con-
duct defenses. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 180-82 (4th ed.
1992); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 280 (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 54
(1987). See also Geistfeld, supra note 13, at 1172 n.41 (summarizing consensus).
17. It is now commonplace for writers to presume that products liability is a subset
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liticized during the insurance-crisis era of Republican presidential
administrations,ag most observers of products liability agreed
(whether with pleasure or dismay) that the doctrine was an instru-
ment of political change. Products liability became a vehicle for
distribution-that is, distribution of risks, benefits, product supply,
insurance, and whatever other desiderata appeared necessary.' 9 In
his time, Traynor recognized the power of this particular new idea;
so do American lawyers. The label "products liability" adds no
new content to the law, but it makes for a useful slogan.
And yet a product cannot be liable, or can it?
Here I propose a new answer. In place of the failed public
law vision that saw products as the instruments of policy, I offer
an inquiry into the nature of products themselves. Their impor-
tance, I argue, has been overlooked in the law. Products describe
societies. Names for the eras of human history-the Stone, Iron,
and Bronze Ages, the Industrial Revolution, the Atomic Age-re-
veal that the objects people create represent entire eons.20
Looking at objects fills a doctrinal void: A basic omission in
the study of products liability is the concept- of property. Products
are objects, and objects are fundamental constituents of property.
Because in practice products liability law seldom raises questions
of ownership, it is easy to overlook property law while attempting
to explain the doctrine. The great studies of private property, how-
ever, shed light on the subjects of manufacture and use. Theorists
such as Locke, who linked labor, creation, and ownership; Hegel,
of microeconomics, and that scholars are in the mainstream of products liability only if
they view this subject in economic terms. See, e.g., Croley & Hanson, supra note 16, at
690 n.21 (asserting that the economics-focused writers whom the authors discuss are "a
representative sample" of products liability scholars, and mentioning eleven writers, main-
ly outside this tradition, whose work the authors decided to disregard); Alan Schwartz,
The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 819 (1992) (implying that all
arguments and counterarguments pertaining to strict liability are economics-based). For
contrary postures, see David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law:
Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 429-30 (1993) (arguing that prod-
uct accidents are moral events); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private
Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 681 (1985).
18. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 744-45 (2d ed. 1992). See also infra note 34 (describing
reformist agendas of Ronald Reagan, George Bush, and Dan Quayle).
19. See Weinrib, supra note 17, at 687 (reacting negatively to this aspect of Ameri-
can products liability discourse).
20. MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING OF
THINGS: DOMESTIC SYMBOLS AND THE SELF ix (1981).
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who connected property with personhood; and Marx, whose under-
standing of industrialization is taken for granted in modem prod-
ucts liability law, are all important sources of products liability.
Their theories of property give rise to a concept that I label "det-
rimental-objects law," a counterpart to the beneficial-objects law
that property law has long expounded.
Lacking attention to property-law antecedents, explanations of
products liability rely on tort and contract. As a result they are
not only incomplete but inaccurate. Tort law still lives in the shad-
ow of its ancestor, the writ of trespass. Although the requirement
of direct application of force has long been dropped-if it ever
was observed-the tort perspective relies on a simple model of bi-
polar force, A upon B, wrongdoer upon victim. Products liability
lies beyond that shadow. Contract law, which rightly focuses on
the sale and purchase of a good as the basis for liability, suffers
from its own lapse-the premise that a user chooses a product to
fulfill her antecedent need.
Products, however, play an a priori role as stimuli to behavior.
The one-way vectors of tort and contract theory-"A hit B,"'
"A chose product X," "M manipulated C"--do not begin to
describe the network that binds consumers, producers, and observ-
ers who select, display, encounter, use, and sell a product. For pur-
poses of products liability, three entities-product, user, and mak-
er-are interrelated agents. In this network, products function as
dynamic actors, notwithstanding the conventional view that "any
product is little more than an inert object until some person uses
it."
24
21. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 167
(1973).
22. See, eg., Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 787 F.2d 726, 731 (1st Cir. 1986)
(attempting to reconstruct what plaintiff had in mind when he purchased smoke detector);
MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 75-79 (1993)
(focusing on consumer decision to acquire product).
23. See Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doc-
trine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109
(1974).
24. Robert E. Powell et A., The Sophisticated User Defense and Liability for Defec-
tive Design: The Twain Must Meet, 13 J. PROD. LIAB. 113, 115 (1991). In arguing that in-
sights derived from property theory help to explain the dynamism and agency of prod-
ucts, I do not contend that property theorists would necessarily favor the argument.
Jeremy Waldron, for instance, emphasizes the person-to-other-people nature of property
law. In his view, property is a scheme of interests vis-h-vis other persons, and there are
no legal relations between persons and things. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO
1995]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:1
In order to make sense, the study of products liability must
include not only the missing insights of property theory, but also
those of sociology,' especially the branch known as symbolic in-
teractionism. Symbolic interactionism holds that every human being
has a self, and that self is created by social life." A person per-
ceives the world around her and interprets that world to herself.
In a post-industrial setting, material objects or products make up a
large share of the world perceived. Members of a culture create,
share, and interpret symbolic properties attributed to products.
Because of their dynamic function, products participate in social
life.' They shape identities and communicate messages to observ-
ers.O
PRIVATE PROPERTY 27-28 (1988). My own reading of The Right to Private Property finds
that Professor Waldron undercuts his posture later in the book. See infra note 60 and ac-
companying text.
25. The most celebrated influence of sociology on law is Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, 347 U.S. 483, 492-94 (1954), in which the Supreme Court relied on sociological
evidence to declare that racial segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. For other examples, see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
(reviewing evidence of race discrimination in the decision to impose a death penalty);
American Booksellers Assoc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986) (accepting evidence of harms caused by pornography). Sociology has had less
direct influence on the development of private law.
26. See HERBERT BLUMER, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: PERSPECTIVE AND METHOD
2-4 (1969).
27. Professor Csikszentmihalyi argues that products can exploit and dominate human
beings. For example, he writes, tobacco was unknown to white Europeans until the voy-
ages from Europe to the Americas during the sixteenth century. The resultant popularity
of tobacco helped to install and entrench slavery in the United States. Although tobacco
has made only dubious contributions to humanity, it is clear that "humans have benefited
the spread of tobacco." MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, THE EVOLVING SELF: A PSYCHOLO-
GY FOR THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 127-28 (1993).
Like many other writers Csikszentmihalyi finds the automobile replete with dyna-
mism:
Instead of using [the automobile] we begin to be used by it. We worry about
payments, its upkeep, about the insurance, about vandals, accidents, and so
forth, and soon part of our control over consciousness is gone. But all along
cars keep multiplying because they find a rich medium of propagation in the
human mind.
Id at 140.
28. The association between legal doctrine and the symbolism present in consumer
products has received increased attention in the legal literature. See, e.g., Malla Pollack,
Your Image is My Image. When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the Public Do-
main-With an Example from the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1391, 1397-1446 (1993) (using symbolic communication in support of proposed reas-
sessment of trademark law); Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of
Radin's Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 384-97 (1993) (de-
scribing the relationship between consumer culture and property theory).
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In Part II, moving from a theoretical construct into law as it
is experienced, I look at specific examples of how the law views
products as agents. Products became the source of strict liability by
analogy to dangerous animals and other personified wrongdoers.
After the growth of technology, products came to symbolize pow-
er. More recently, symbolism has become evident in the anthropo-
morphic writing that mourns "lost" products and argues that con-
sumer goods depend on a kindly liability system to remain in exis-
tence. Symbolic interactionism explains the decision to regard
products as dynamic.29
This concept of product dynamism pervades the legal tradi-
tions that have shaped American law. Ancient and medieval legal
codes provided for the prosecution of errant animals and inani-
mate objects. The French principle of fait de la chose, or act of a
thing, is the basis of modem products liability in several civil law
countries; and, as I will argue, fait de la chose has important and
close analogues in Anglo-American concepts such as deodands and
forfeiture, and also in modem rules of products liability and prop-
erty law. The view that inanimate objects are dynamic is a tradi-
tional notion, not a radical one.
These precedents help to answer the vexing question of how
tort and contract fit together in products liability. The contracts-
based ancestry of products liability law, often neglected in the
current era of "strict liability in tort," influences several elements
of current doctrine. Among them are the consumer expectations
test for design defect, misrepresentation (even though this doctrine
is often classified under torts), and breach of warranty as a sepa-
rate cause of action. Furthermore, products liability requires a
business transaction, and this aspect is more consistent with con-
tract than tort law. Nonetheless, contract theory is slighted in most
explanations of products liability.0 During the last several de-
cades, the Restatement of Torts has vanquished the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC) as the unifying codification of products liabil-
29. For a rare judicial expression of this point, see Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, 450 A.2d
615, 633 (Pa. 1982) (Larsen, J., dissenting). Justice Larsen referred to the "invitational
aspect" of a product and noted that a product "speaks to society" through that aspect.
This approach "elevates to requisite prominence the pivotal interplay between product
and users (society)." Id.
30. See, eg., HENDERSON & TWERSKi, supra note 18, at xxix ("This is a book about




ity. In legal education, products liability is generally taught in torts
courses. By contrast, this Article highlights the ongoing role of
contract theory in products liability. Once the agency of a product
is acknowledged, product manufacture, sale, and use all become
important as transactions-the essence of contract.
Tort approaches to products liability retain their power and
normative appeal, but in -a revised way. Negligence law continues
to be useful.31 It helps to assess decisions of product design and
warning. It works well to decide cases that do not fit within what
I later call "true products liability," such as harm to employees. Its
approaches also remain relevant in adjudging comparative fault.
Tort theory conveys some of the flavor of wrongdoing or miscon-
duct that I argue is chargeable to products themselves. "Strict
liability in tort," however, is an extraordinarily unhelpful and mis-
leading way to describe responsibility for product-caused harms.
Unlike "products liability," an illuminating and revealing phrase,
"strict liability in tort" and "strict products liability" are obfuscato-
ry. 2 -Tort law informs products liability, therefore, in its elucida-
tions of fault, relative fault (as in plaintiffs-conduct defenses),
intentional harm, and error that may be charged to persons. It
does not explain products liability; only a reconciliation of tort and
contract, influenced by property theory, can address that task.
In Part III, having established the existence of legal recogni-
tion of product dynamism, I extend this recognition by offering
some preliminary answers to a fundamental question: When is a
product appropriately a source of blame for an individual? For my
answer, I return to the elements of product dynamism, which I
identify as symbolic effect (alternatively, symbolic communication)
and a triangular relationship among maker, product, and user.
When these elements are strongly present, it becomes appropriate
to say, the thing is to blame; and sometimes, the thing is this
31. For a sampler of cases involving defective products where courts rejected or ig-
nored strict products liability as a descriptive label yet had no trouble finding in favor of
plaintiffs using negligence reasoning, see City of Thomasville v. Lease Inc., 268 S.E.2d
190, 194-96 (N.C. 1980); H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Lansdown, 567 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1978); Wright v. Creative Corp., 498 P.2d 1179, 1182-83 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
32. For this reason, I frequently set off these phrases using quotation marks. It
seems to be customary for products liability writers to use this punctuation device to ex-
press skepticism or disdain. See, e.g., QUICK FACTS, supra note 15, at 14 (the "so-called
'crisis' ").
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maker's thing. With this device, I explore some practical problems
of doctrine and suggest solutions.
It is important to note here what the theory of product dyna-
mism does not aspire to answer. Product dynamism does not say
prescriptively whether a defendant ought to be deemed liable: that
question is to be answered in traditional fashion, with established
legal principles of responsibility. Instead, the theory is descriptive.
Product dynamism is present to varying degrees in all situations
where persons are injured by a product. The approach described
in this Article indicates a method of assessing the strength of this
presence in any given case. An observer should look at the ac-
count of injury described in the lawsuit, and then inquire whether
product dynamism was strongly present there. It can be helpful to
break the question into three parts: is this injurious entity a prod-
uct; is this plaintiff a user; and is this defendant a maker. For true
products liability to be present, the answer to all three questions
must be yes. The questions overlap with one another, but are not
redundant; in some of the "hard cases" of products liability law,
such as the problem of corporate-successor liability, the answers to
the three questions may not be the same. No determination of
ultimate liability emerges: That outcome depends on sources ex-
trinsic to the theory.
Would attention to the criteria of true products liability affect
the way cases are decided? Yes and no. William Prosser, an orig-
inator of modem products liability law, once wrote that the change
from negligence to strict products liability would have almost no
effect on case outcomes.33 In many senses this famous assertion,
or prediction, has been proved wrong;' 4 in other senses Prosser
33. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consum-
er), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114 (1960).
34. The change from negligence to strict liability has been volatile. Since Prosser ex-
pressed his view, products liability as a specialty for academies, practicing lawyers, jour-
nalists, lobbyists, and many others has burgeoned. Within the last twenty years, dozens of
state statutes on products liability were enacted, several casebooks written and re-issued,
two crises declared, task forces formed, specialist departments in law firms created, a new
Restatement undertaken, and hundreds of books and articles published. Ronald Reagan
spoke about products liability, as did George Bush in his 1990 State of the Union ad-
dress, and Dan Quayle took up the reform cause. See generally ANITA BERNSTEIN, Pref-
ace, in A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ANTHOLOGY xiii (1995) (describing growth in products
liability law and commentary); Joe Queenan, Birth of a Notion: How the Think Tank
Industry Came Up With an Issue that Dan Quayle Could Call His Own, WASH. POST,
Sept. 20, 1992, at Cl. The mushrooming of products liability has affected case outcomes,
although to an unknown extent and direction. See generally RICHARD NEELY, THE
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remains quite right.' Here, similarly, I have disclaimed any ambi-
tion to craft or prescribe liability rules, and the theory of product
dynamism does not necessarily point to liability different in force
than would be indicated by a fault- or warranty-based regime.
In particular, the theory of product dynamism does not furnish
plaintiffs with a doctrinal windfall. Because product dynamism de-
scribes a triangle of communication involving product, maker, and
user, it departs from other visions of products liability that empha-
size the role of a powerful agent who sends manipulative messages
to the consumer.' The theory of product dynamism recognizes
the agency and power of the user as well as that of the maker and
the product.37 Thus the paradigm supports such doctrinal recogni-
tion of this user-power as comparative negligence, the patent-dan-
ger rule, and assumption of risk. 8 The user is more than a hap-
less recipient of agency. At the same time, product dynamism re-
cognizes the discrete roles of product and maker, suggesting that
the user is engaged in communication with two independent agents
and therefore receives a reinforced, two-on-one message. This
extra quantum of agency might militate in favor of increased liabil-
ity or a presumption against certain defendants. But the precise
PRODUCr LIABILITY MESS: HOW BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED FROM THE POLITICS OF
STATE COURTS (1988) (arguing that political and social climate affects the filing, settling,
and adjudication of products liability actions); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore
Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal
Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990) (assembling data to argue that publicity accompa-
nying large verdicts has contributed to reversing a pro-plaintiff direction in the law).
35. Other writers have noted the similarities between strict liability and negligence as
these doctrines are applied to product-caused injury. See Griffith, supra note 9; Sheila L.
Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict
Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 647-48 (1980).
36. Scholarly writings that emphasize this role include HENDERSON & TWERSKI,
supra note 18, at 104 (suggesting that "Madison Avenue" contributes significantly to
products liability); SHAPO, supra note 22, at 73-75; Note, Harnessing Madison Avenue:
Advertising and Products Liability Theory, 107 HARV. L. REV. 895 (1994).
37. Howard Latin's masterful attack on warning doctrine portrays a typical user who
neither receives, heeds, understands, nor acts on warnings due to realities of cognition
and heuristics. I agree with Professor Latin's two major points: that the question of
whether product warnings work is an empirical one, and that the futility of warnings
should not necessarily excuse sellers from liability. See Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings,
Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1193 (1994). My principal
difference with Latin centers around my theme of communication in contrast to his of
noncommunication.
38. This conclusion happens to coincide with that of many economic analysts. See
sources cited supra note 16.
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doctrinal effect of product dynamism must await common-law de-
velopment.
As reconceived here, products liability becomes coherent in a
conceptual sense, whereas before it was coherent only in a nomi-
nal sense.39 Due to misunderstanding, the main criterion of a
products liability case has been the presence of something labeled
a product, accused of doing harm. Mere assertion by litigants or
observers creates "products liability"; and neither case law nor
commentary can show why all liability is not classifiable under this
ill-defined rubric.' Thus in summarizing the essential character-
istics of products liability, I have helped to move the doctrine into
clarity although, as I acknowledge, more of the task remains.
I. PRODUCT DYNAMISM
The answer to the question How Can a Product Be Liable?
lies beyond the domain of law. Heuristic insights come from an
examination of work in the humanities tradition-political theory,
philosophy, and literature-and from the social sciences, especially
social psychology. These disciplines explain the role of things in
social ordering as well as in the creation and continued develop-
39. Professor Powers diagnoses the same problem of incoherence, but proposes a
radically different cure:
Current products liability law is a mess. Its foundation is flawed, its content is
exceedingly complex, and its effect on personal injury litigation is pernicious.
The primary culprit is the very hallmark of products liability law: the decision
to distinguish product cases from other personal injury cases and subject them
to strict products liability as a special theory of recovery. Courts should aban-
don this distinction and resolve product cases within the general framework of
negligence law.
Powers, supra note 9, at 639. Abolishing products liability and replacing it with negligence
would offer a speedy remedy for various ailments within the current system. See infra
text accompanying notes 191-95, 303-11, 322-24 (describing doctrinal dilemmas). The
problem with this very practical idea is conceptual: Powers cannot explain why a separate
doctrine-that is, "the decision to distinguish product cases"--is attractive to so many ob-
servers. Moreover, while my claim that products liability is part of property law will be
controversial, nobody disputes the contracts-based antecedents of products liability, and
yet Powers would purge this history entirely from current doctrine.
40. The question of taxonomy of liability extends beyond product-caused injury. For
overviews of some of the recurring questions, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1092-93 (1972) (exploring the intersection between property law
and tort law under the rubric of entitlements); Madeline Morris, The Structure of
Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 822 (1993) (revising prior attempts at taxonomy to
identify fourteen forms of entitlement or interest that may warrant recognition by the le-
gal system).
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ment of human beings. Things are never "mere"; they produce and
receive meaning in society.
As detailed below, the work of Locke and Hegel, among
others, shows the importance of objects (a larger category that
includes products) in establishing a source of identity or person-
hood in human beings. The legal distinction between objects and
products, as I go on to argue, originates in the work of Karl Marx.
Modem products liability finds salient the same differences that
Marx emphasized. Once the concepts of an object and product are
fixed, more recent work in the tradition of symbolic interactionism
demonstrates the meaning of things in society.
A. Homo Faber
To begin, a product may be defined as an object that has
been shaped by human intentionality. A maker creates a product,
and a user employs it. Thus, a product is twice dependent on in-
tention for its existence: Its maker selects and processes informa-
tion to create the object, and its user selects and processes infor-
mation during the use of the product.4 Homo faber, the maker
and user of things, has both powers of intention.
The concepts of manufacture and use, though seldom studied
by products liability scholars, contribute greatly to the explanation
of products liability. A dominant posture in the products liability
literature regards manufacture as the economic activity of a firm
to which costs can be charged.42 The manufacturer, who has en-
gaged in risky conduct, may have to pay for having caused danger.
In contrast to this view, I argue in this section that manufacture is
different from other risk-imposing activities. Manufacture creates a
thing that is let loose, severed from its maker. In its departure
from the maker, a thing acquires an identity and autonomy that
distinguish the object from conduct.
41. See CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 20, at 14.
42. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 180-81; SHAvELL, supra note 16, at 23, 47. This
view can be described as reciprocal: both the person harmed by a product and its manu-
facturer are engaged in activity, and "[t]he real question that has to be decided is: should
A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?" Ronald H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960).
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1. The Object as a Source of Personhood. As a descriptive
label, homo faber unites the contributions of property theory to
products liability. Man is the maker and user of objects, and
manufacture and use are essential elements of human existence.
The labor theory of property, often attributed to John Locke,
emphasizes the connection between human intention and the cre-
ation of tangible property. Complementing the labor theory,
Hegel's emphasis on ownership, freedom, and the satisfaction of
needs suggests the legal importance of the concept of use.
The concept of homo faber shows that products liability be-
longs as much to the domain of property law as it does to the
more familiar domains of tort and contract. Both contract and tort
law start too late: they follow from the conduct of persons. It is
property that notes the earlier human intentionality, that of the
maker, and that grasps the unique influence of things on the for-
mation of a person. Thus an appreciation of products liability law
calls for study of the classic justifications of private property.
For centuries philosophers and legal theorists have labored to
build a normative case for private ownership. In defending private
property, these works have emphasized what is important about
that property. And because property is so important, objects-that
is, tangible and moveable property-can be understood to share in
that importance.
In political and legal theory, the most famous defense of pri-
vate property is credited to John Locke, although this defense had
important predecessors In the Second Treatise of Government,
Locke justified private property by reference to human labor:
[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person .. . The Labour
of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are prop-
erly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Na-
ture hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with,
and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it
his Property.'
43. See Floyd W. Rudmin, Ownership as Interpersonal Dominance: A History and
Three Studies of the Social Psychology of Property 16 (March 1988) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author) (citing Overton, John of Paris, Fortesue, and Roman writings
as sources for Locke).




This "labor theory" rests on the premise that persons have a
property right in themselves, especially their own work. When a
person mixes his work with a physical thing that is not the proper-
ty of another, he has a right of ownership in that thing.' This
right derives from the earlier right, which Locke did not explicitly
defend, of the right of property in one's person.
Convincing justifications of private property rely on concepts
of personhood. 6 Aristotle linked private property with moral de-
velopment, arguing that a man needs leisure and material resourc-
es to learn civic-mindedness and friendship. 7 Following the reviv-
al of Aristotle, the fourteenth-century Scholastics defended private
property by connecting it to human nature. William of Occam ar-
gued that property is a natural human creation based on reason,
and Marsilius of Padua believed that private property originated in
the innate sense of free will in every human being.'
Denunciations of private property likewise rely on the rela-
tionship between property and personhood. To those writers who
refused to acknowledge private ownership of things, private prop-
erty corrupts the individual,4 9 usurps what is really the domain of
God,5" betrays a communal ideal,5' or oppresses those who lack
45. The right is qualified by the famous "Lockean proviso"-the individual must
leave "enough, and as good" in the state of nature, so as not to defeat the opportunity
of a later-arriving person to acquire property through labor. Id. at 306.
46. See STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 145-47 (1990) (discussing
personal character traits in relation to property as they develop in different economic
systems); WALDRON, supra note 24, at 45, 290-91, 443-44 (comparing Lockean and
Hegelian theories of the relationship between private property and individual liberty).
Professor Epstein has defended private property on the modest grounds of administrative
convenience, tradition, and the absence of compelling contrary visions of how property
ought to be held. See Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L.
REV. 1221 (1979). Writers in the libertarian tradition defend private property mainly by
objecting to the coercion necessary to change present allocations. See FRIEDRICH A.
HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 87 (1960); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE
AND UTOPIA 155-74 (1974). Although these views are important and influential, they
justify private property only as compared to an alternative regime.
47. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 85-91 (H. Rackham trans., 1932).
48. See Rudmin, supra note 43, at 12-13 (citations omitted).
49. See, e.g., CHARLES AVILA, OWNERSHIP: EARLY CHRISTIAN TEACHING (1983)
(discussing selected Christian scholars' criticisms of private ownership); PLATO, THE RE-
PUBLIC OF PLATO 4-5 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1901); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Preface
to Narcissus, in THE INDISPENSABLE ROUSSEAU 47, 48 (John H. Mason ed., 1979).
50. See AVILA, supra note 49, at 78, 114-15 (discussing work of St. Augustine).
51. See Rudmin, supra note 43, at 4 (quoting "all is common among friends," a
slogan of the school of Pythagoras).
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such private property.52 Other theorists of property such as
Hobbes and Hume did not seek to abolish or defend private prop-
erty but insisted that understanding property requires an under-
standing of human desires and impulses.53 Tangible property is
thus connected to personhood. The right to own property necessar-
ily follows from the premise that persons own themselves.'
Perhaps the most adamant insistence on the relationship be-
tween property and the individual psyche appears in the works of
Hegel, especially The Philosophy of Right, in which Hegel declares
that there can be no personhood without property: "If emphasis is
placed on my needs, then the possession of property appears as a
means to their satisfaction, but the true position is that, from the
standpoint of freedom, property is the first embodiment of free-
dom and so is in itself a substantive end."5 This stance is directly
contrary to conventional views of products liability. The product-
as-inert-object approach presumes that "emphasis is placed" on the
needs of an individual, with products deployed to fill those needs.
For Hegel this approach fails to begin at the beginning. Without a
relationship to property, the individual is not a person and cannot
have the needs of a person. Human will is embedded in things,
and things are embedded in human will.56
Private property conduces to selfhood in several ways. Appro-
priation, for Hegel, leads to understanding: A person who appro-
priates a material object simultaneously takes it and knows it,
thereby gaining mastery of the natural world.57 This expression
requires some degree of ownership on the part of the individual
(the property could conceivably be shared58) and also requires
that object be inanimate.59 Ownership also enables the individual
52. See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in
MARX & ENGELS: BASIC WRITINGS IN POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 21 (Lewis S. Feuer
ed., 1959).
53. See Rudmin, supra note 43, at 14-18.
54. As Floyd Rudmin has pointed out, the centrality of personhood in explanations
of property means that property is an important constituent of psychology-and therefore
philosophical justifications of private property contribute to the literature of psychology as
well as political theory. See id.
55. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 45, at 42 (T.M. Knox trans., 1952).
56. See id.
57. See Peter G. Stillman, Property, Freedom and Individuality in Hegel's and Marx's
Political Thought, in NoMos XXII: PROPERTY 130, 137 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1980).
58. See MUNZER, supra note 46, at 81-82.
59. The evil of slavery is that it makes an object of a person; put another way, it
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to have a realm of resource use that does not depend on the
agreement or cooperation of other persons. A person who owns
property can devise plans and assert preferences, even ones that
affront other persons.' Mutual recognition follows: The individual
can infer "myself" from "mine" and "you" from "yours" after
one's will has been embedded in objects. 1
For Hegel, all of personality may be explained in terms of
property. Every abstract right-the right to one's own life and
body, the right over inner life and conscience, and the right to
social status as a free person-is a right of property and of self-
ownership.62 Social arrangements must provide for this process of
human self-actualization. 3 In civil society, personality-through-
property has legal recognition,' and "to describe what people
own is to say something important about them." 65
Current understandings of property law have benefited from
application of the Hegelian connection between objects and per-
sonhood. One important application is a distinction that Margaret
Jane Radin has proposed, between property integral to personhood
and property held instrumentally or for investment.' For Profes-
denies that the slave is an agent with free will of her own. See HEGEL, supra note 55, §
57, at 48.
60. See WALDRON, supra note 24, at 302-03. Standard childrearing advice urges
American parents to tell children that they own at least a few toys that they need never
share. Ownership is thus regarded as crucial to human development. See, e.g., BENJAMIN
SPOCK & MICHAEL B.. ROTHENBERG, 'BABY AND CHILD CARE 456-57 (1985) (recom-
mending that parents not force young children to be generous because possessiveness is a
natural state of development). For a careful association of the Hegelian view of property
with the development of personality beginning in childhood, see MUNZER, supra note 46,
at 84-86.
61. See HEGEL, supra note 55, § 46, at 42-43.
62. See ALLEN W. WOOD, HEGEL'S ETHICAL THOUGHT 22 (1990).
63. Id. at 107.
64. MUNZER, supra note 46, at 151 (citing G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., 1965)).
65. Id.
66. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982)
[hereinafter Radin, Personhood]. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and
Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993) (examining whether dollar compensation for
personal injury and the harm incurred in the injury are commensurable); Margaret Jane
Radin, Lacking a Transformative Social Theory: A Response, 45 STAN. L. REv. 409
(1993) (elaborating on arguments made in Personhood); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-In-
alienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (exploring the concept of market-inalienabili-
ty, an expression describing a good that cannot be sold).
This distinction has applications to doctrine. For example, as Radin points out in
another article, residential rent control could be defended as protecting property integral
to personhood (a home) at the expense of property held instrumentally. Margaret Jane
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sor Radin, property integral to personhood warrants stronger pro-
tection in the law. In contrast to Radin's prescriptions based on a
normative reading of Hegel, I offer a narrower and descriptive in-
ference: Because property is integral to personhood, the law of
injurious objects has evolved and retains conceptual appeal.
The connection between property and products liability has
been obscured by the importance of ownership as a property topic.
Property theory connects objects with reason, morality, free will,
and human labor. When a person combines her labor with an ob-
ject, more occurs than a simple justification for ownership. Ac-
cording to Locke, the object changes 7 The person changes too:
She feels different; she is entitled to feel different. For Hegel,
these changes are inevitable elements of human life.'
As theorists have long agreed, however, chattels are not al-
ways desirable things.69 Property theory thus pertains also to det-
riment. It explains deprivation of beneficial objects, corruption
caused by excess, and physical injury attributable to contact with
harmful objects. Understanding the importance of objects leads to
understanding the evolution and endurance of detrimental-objects
law. The law of beneficial property is expressed in traditional
property topics such as bailment, conversion, and decedents' es-
tates; the law of detrimental property includes products liability.7
Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL & PuB. AFF. 350 (1986). A: distinction of this
kind may explain in part the defeat of constitutional challenges to rent control. See, e.g.,
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1
(1988).
67. See LOCKE, supra note 44, at 306-07, 315.
68. See Radin, Personhood, supra note 66, at 977 ("[T]he notion that the will is
embodied in things suggests that the entity we know as a person cannot come to exist
without both differentiating itself from the physical environment and yet maintaining
relationships with portions of that environment.").
69. See Rudmin, supra note 43, passim; see also supra note 49 and accompanying
text (noting corrupting effects of possessions).
70. Products liability may be viewed as a Hegelian topic in a another sense. "Det-
rimental personalty"-products that cause physical injury-is a category that requires a
direct involvement between the person of an individual and the product. Other types of
property, which may cause detriment to their owners, do not fall within products liability.
For example, a politician might wish to avoid possessing shares of stock in a disreputable
corporation for fear of career harm, yet this property does not cause physical injury and
lies beyond products liability. In expanding his theory of property-as-personality, Hegel
required an intimate connection between owner and owned: a kind of use that closely
affects the life of the person. See WALDRON, supra note 24, at 366.
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2. Marx: Manufacture, Alienated Labor, and Animated Pro-
ducts. As legal historians point out, modem accident law began
with industrialization.7' Before nineteenth-century technology, the
ways in which persons could carelessly injure one another were so
few that the legal concept of negligence scarcely existed.
Industrialization created new concepts, products liability among
them.7" Before creating products liability, however, indus-
trialization created products-manufactured objects-whose proper-
ties could be traced not only to a producer or seller, but to some
technology. These are the objects that may be blamed for injury in
a modem products liability action.
Products liability, then, has paid heed to historical events. It
uses the Industrial Revolution as a divider between past law and
current doctrine. It grants products a unique, individual status. It
relies on the concept of manufacture, which creates a subcategory,
products, out of a larger category, objects. It emphasizes the pres-
ence of human labor in a product. In all of these traits, products
liability is "Marxist"-that is, consistent with observations that
Karl Marx made in his early writings. Products liability implicitly
recognizes proletarian labor, acknowledges that labor is embedded
in products, and deems products animated.
71. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 299-302
(2d ed. 1985); MORTON J. HORWrrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 99 (1992) [hereinafter HORWrrz, CRISIS];
MORTON J. HORWriz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 99-108
(1977) (offering "subsidy theory" to explain the ascendancy of no-liability-without-fault).
The most influential critique of the Horwitz-Friedman thesis, Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law
and the Economy in the Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J.
1717, 1735-58 (1981), does not challenge the general assertion that industrialization affect-
ed modem accident law.
72. In maintaining that products liability is critically connected to industrialization, I
am differing in part with those who trace the doctrine closely to preindustrial liability for
contaminated food. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963)
(asserting that strict liability for manufacturers was "[riecognized farst in the case of un-
wholesome food products"). See also Dix W. Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift
Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REv. 963, 1017-18 (1957). Liability for defective
food is certainly an important precursor to modem sales law. This doctrine, however,
lacks many crucial defining elements of products liability. One of these elements is that
the product is radically severable from its maker, another theme is that a product can
comport entirely with the conscious and well-intended design of a maker yet still have
that design be the source of liability. As a historical phenomenon, heightened liability for
bad food developed because the consumer's need to eat was regarded as essential and
non-negotiable; in contrast, I argue here that products liability is related to the negotia-
ble, choice-driven need to acquire and consume.
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a. Manufacture: from artisan to proletarian. A useful
starting point to note the effect of industrialization on products
liability law is the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.73 Edward Levi and others celebrated the case because of its
triumphant logic.74 In what seemed to be a flash, Cardozo cut
through the distinction between products "imminently dangerous to
life,"" such as poison mislabeled as a cure, and things that ap-
pear benign. "What is true of the coffee urn is equally true of
bottles of aerated water, 76 Cardozo mused in dictum, thus join-
ing together all products "reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made."'  Whereas his predecessors had
insisted on noting the nature of an item and sorting it accord-
ingly-food or poison?-Cardozo saw objects a priori, all of them
sources of potential power. Although nothing in MacPherson pro-
claims a distinctive kind of liability for the harms caused by prod-
ucts7s the opinion is rightly admired for its originality.
It is at least not surprising (I do not wish to say inevitable)
that this insight about the nature and power of objects would be
announced in early twentieth-century America, in an industrialized
state, by a great judge attuned to historical change in the law. In-
tellect and learning enabled Cardozo to perceive the correct deci-
sion in MacPherson, but the significance of objects could be
brought out only at a certain point in space and time. In 1916,
most educated Americans who lived in industrial areas of the
nation believed in the tenet of progress through technology.79 In-
dustrial production and distribution of objects had given rise to
modern life.
Mass production and distribution of objects had several impli-
cations in the early twentieth century, some of them in tension
with others. A new relationship between producer and user was
emerging. Cardozo perceived this change and recognized in the
73. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
74. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 20-25 (1949);
Prosser, supra note 33, at 1100.
75. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1052.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1053.
78. Cardozo presumed that Donald MacPherson could prove negligence. See George
L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modem Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STuD. 461, 468-69 (1985).
79. See Charles A. Beard, Introduction to JOHN BURY, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS ix,
xxxvii (Dover Publications, Inc. 1955) (1920).
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process the need to relax the old requirement of privity, because
he understood that a near-substitute of privity develops when
products bring disparate people together. Once established, this
connection alters the concept of relational duty, the element of
personal injury law that Cardozo took so seriously in his later and
even more famous opinion.8" Although products bring people to-
gether, they are also a force of separation: A product made in one
place might be shipped to another and sold at a third. As early
twentieth-century history shows, a man could make a fortune sell-
ing mass-produced objects."1 Less directly, the mass production
and distribution of goods built nonretail fortunes. 2 The Buick
automobile complained of in MacPherson was a symbol of trans-
formation, evident to Cardozo in his time and place.
What was transformed? Before industrialization, according to
Karl Marx, homo faber was an artisan. Making a product, he de-
ployed his energies for his own benefit in a way that was consis-
tent with his own powers.'S For Marx, this ability and need to
engage in productive work was the distinguishing feature of the
human species.' The concept of barter exemplified this view of
human work. In barter, "each of the owners has produced whatev-
er his immediate needs, his bent and the available resources dictat-
ed.... Labour was indeed the immediate source of subsistence
but at the same time it meant the activation of his individual exis-
tence."85
80. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
81. For accounts of retail-based fortunes built in the early twentieth century, see
RUSSELL B. ADAMS, JR., KING C. GILLETTE: THE MAN AND HIS WONDERFUL SHAVING
DEvICE (1978); ALFRED C. FULLER, A FOOT IN THE DOOR: THE LIFE APPRAISAL OF
THE ORIGINAL FULLER BRUSH MAN AS TOLD TO HARTZELL SPENSE (1960).
82. See JOSEPH F. WALL, ALFRED I. DU PONT: THE MAN AND HIS FAMILY (1990);
ALLAN NEVINS, JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER: THE HEROIC AGE OF AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
(1940).
83. See KARL MARX, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in KARL MARX:
EARLY WRITINGS 279, 328-29 (Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton trans., Vintage
Books 1975) (1932).
84. See id. at 328-29.
85. Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of Political Economy, in KARL MARX: EAR-
LY WRITINGS, supra note 83, at 259, 268.
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Industrialization always transforms the life of the worker.'
Work, once an integral part of his life, becomes "a torment for
him, '  a "mortification,"'  and "a loss of his self. '89 For the
proletarian, labor is a complete negation of his humanity and the
powers that separate him from lower animals." He is enslaved by
the demands of capital. Whereas the artisan had a right and duty
to work in certain means of production, the proletarian lacks
both.9' Paid by another man for the use of his waking hours, the
proletarian works to stay alive-to acquire money to pay for sub-
sistence. Hence, he "feels himself only when he is not working;
when he is working he does not feel himself. He is at home when
he is not working, and not at home when he is working."'  In-
dustrialization, by substituting money for the earlier rewards that
laborers received from their work, destroys humanity.
Although products liability law does not manifest the same
revolutionary inferences from this account that Marx drew, it
nonetheless reveals agreement with the description. Like Marx's
account, products liability law focuses on the discontinuity between
individual wishes or conduct and the manufacture of a product.
J.A. Jolowicz's question-does "products liability" mean liability
for manufacturing or liability for selling?g9 -- is thus answered:
Neither. These conduct-based grounds of liability derive from
preindustrial tort and contract law, and they presume an integrity
86. But see G.A. COHEN, HISTORY, LABOUR AND FREEDOM: THEMES FROM MARX
189 (1988) (deriding as romantic the notion of the "ancestral work scene as a garden
from which capitalist development expelled the producers, to deposit them in an indus-
trial hell").
87. MARx, supra note 83, at 330.
88. Id. at 326.
89. Id. at 327.
90. Raymond Benton makes a pertinent point by contrasting the words for "labor"
and "work." European languages distinguish the two activities with paired terms: la-
borlwork, poneinlergazesthai, laborarelfacere or fabricari, travaillerlouvrer, arbeitenlwerken.
The English, Greek, Latin, French, and German words for "labor" all connote toil and
ungratifying activity (for example, ponein is related to "pain," and travailler to "torture");
thus the contrast to homo faber is animal laborans. See Raymond Benton, Jr., Work,
Consumption, and the Joyless Consumer, in PHILOSOPHICAL AND RADICAL THOUGHT IN
MARKETING 235, 237-38 (A. Fuat Firat et al. eds., 1987). As Professor Benton goes on
to argue, a related linguistic contrast can be drawn between "consumption" and "use,"
the former connoting waste and destruction, the latter intelligent employment. See id. at
239 (citing HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 125-26 (1958)).
91. See COHEN, supra note 86, at 190.
92. MARX, supra note 83, at 326.
93. See Jolowicz, supra note 8, at 370-76.
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between maker and product that is now severed. Now that human
activity is a commodity, alienated and acquired, individuals can no
longer bear all the blame for product harm. They were merely
working when the product was made.
Products liability further separates artisans from proletarians
with its focus on things made by the latter group. In general, the
doctrine applies to objects produced in a repetitive work process
by members of the proletariat who are paid an hourly wage. Ac-
cording to the Second Restatement of Torts, strict products liability
applies only to a "seller" who "is engaged in the business of sell-
ing such a product,"94 a virtual requirement that the seller be an
employer of workers. Caselaw illustrates the point.95 The "manu-
facturer" of products liability doctrine has not made the product; a
proletarian has. Without proletarian labor, products liability doc-
trine as we understand it would not have evolved.
b. Labor embedded and alienated in products. For Marx,
a product was an object into which a worker's labor had "conge-
aled., 96 Human purpose and conduct take form in an entity that
the human worker can no longer control. 7 This transformation is
an aspect of the famous Marxist theory of alienation, a multi-
faceted term that I address here only in part. 8 One of man's
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(a) (1965).
95. For example, when housewives prepared unwholesome turkey salad for a high
school band event, salmonella-infected plaintiffs sued under theories of negligence, implied
warranty, strict liability, and negligence per se. Although the court ultimately rejected
each theory, it gave the most credence to negligence. The court rejected the implied
warranty theory by distinguishing the housewives from "merchants" who have special
responsibilities imposed by the law of implied warranty. See Samson v. Riesing, 215
N.W.2d 662, 669 (Wis. 1974). The disappointed subject of a portrait artist has a remedy
only in contract, if at all. See Gibson v. Cranage, 39 Mich. 49 (1878).
96. BERTELL OLLMAN, ALIENATION: MARX'S CONCEPION OF MAN IN CAPITALIST
SOCIETY 142 (1972) (citation omitted). Another translator renders the point as follows:
"The product of labour is labour embodied and made material in an object, it is the
objectification of labour. The realization of labour is its objectification." MARX, supra
note 83, at 324.
97. See 1 LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI, MAIN CURRENTS OF MARXISM: ITS ORIGINS,
GROWTH AND DISSOLUTION 277 (1978).
98. Marx took the word from Hegel's Phenomenology and reinterpreted it. See
MARX, supra note 83, at 379-400 (critiquing Hegel's dialectic and general philosophy).
Alienation in Marx's writings refers to the state of man under capitalism-that is, a sev-
erance of the vital connections between man and four "others": man's productive activity,
his product, his fellow men, and his species (a reference to the potentialities that distin-
guish human beings from other animals). OLLMAN, supra note 96, at 137 (citations omit-
ted).
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relations that is alienated under capitalism is the relation between
man and his product. Before industrialization, a worker could use
his products either to keep alive or to engage in further produc-
tive activity. After industrialization, he has no claim to these
products, cannot use them, and does not recognize them as his
own.99 "The worker places his life in the object," Marx wrote,
"but now [his life] no longer belongs to him, but to the ob-
ject.' 00
The concept of products liability captures this relation be-
tween human activity and a manufactured object. The very name
of the doctrine, as was noted, reveals a literal meaning. Legal
doctrine does not have a label of "objects liability": The injuring
thing must have been manufactured. Human effort is a necessary
element of products liability, and so is an embodiment of that ef-
fort that can be viewed as distinct from a person. Products liabil-
ity, in other words, recognizes and requires the existence of labor
embedded in objects.'
Legal doctrine further accords with Marx in deeming the pro-
duct powerful, often more strikingly powerful than the individuals
who labored or schemed to make it. Liability for injurious prod-
ucts can reach countless categories of human defendants other
than manufacturers: individual employees, retailers and other inter-
mediaries between maker and seller, municipal employees, or fe-
deral government officials, to name a few.1 2 This expansive lia-
bility has been labeled scornfully as a quest for "deep pock-
ets";0 3 it also indicates the centrality of a product in products
99. See OLLMAN, supra note 96, at 144.
100. MARX, supra note 83, at 324.
101. In a manuscript that was the predecessor to Das Kapital, Marx noted that, be-
fore industrialization, wealth was believed to reside in natural objects and not in com-
modities that are products of labor. See SHLOMO AVINERI, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF KARL MARX 103 (1968) (discussing Marx's Grundrisse der Kritik der
politischen Okonomie).
102. See Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 786 P.2d 939 (Ariz. 1990) (trade-
mark authorizers); Stein v. Southern California Edison Co., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 907 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992) (suppliers); Amoroso v. Samuel Friedland Family Entertainment, 604 So. 2d
827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (commercial lessors); Anderson v. Olmsted Util. Equip.,
Inc., 573 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio 1991) (remanufacturers); Thompson v. Rockford Mach. Tool
Co., 744 P.2d 357 (Wash. 1987) (sellers of used products), review denied, 110 Wash. 2d
1007'(1988); Nelson v. Nelson Hardware, Inc., 467 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. 1991) (sellers).
103. See Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 978 F.2d 1386, 1398 n.24 (5th Cir. 1992)
(Jolly, J., concurring) (characterizing a defendant as having been sued only for the sake
of its deep pockets); DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 143 (Cal. 1992) (describing
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liability litigation. One item can unite a multitude of human be-
ings, overwhelming them. For Marx, products overpower both their
makers and all individuals in society.'04
c. Animated products. The great power of products, ac-
cording to Marx, is their ability to control human behavior. This
power is most apparent in the creation of job descriptions. The
work of a worker consists of the needs of the product; a product
demands what must be done in a day's work, and the worker ad-
justs to that demand."
But Marx thought the power of products went much further.
In the world of superstition or religion, Marx wrote,
[T]he productions of the human brain appear as independent
beings endowed with life and entering into relation both with
one another and the human race. So it is in the world of com-
modities with the products of men's hands. This I call the Fe-
tishism which attaches itself to the products of labour, so soon as
they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore insepa-
rable from the production of commodities.1 °6
Commodities have power over individuals because of the
desires they create. According to Marx, persons are at the mercy
of what products make them want and become."° A laborer
works to make products so that he can obtain the wages that
enable him to buy the products that another laborer has made.
Proposition 51, an initiative avowedly aimed at limiting plaintiffs' searches for deep pock-
ets); Judith C. Glasscock, Comment, Emptying the Deep Pocket in Mass Tort Litigation,
18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 977 (1987).
104. See OLLMAN, supra note 96, at 145 ("The product gains in power the more the
worker spends his own and, Marx maintains, even acquires qualities (now suitably al-
tered) that the worker loses.").
105. Id. at 146.
106. AvINEI, supra note 101, at 119 (quoting 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 72-74 (Mos-
cow, n.d.)). For example, wood can become a table, Marx wrote, and in this "almost
mythical transformation," William E. Kilbourne, Self-Actualization and the Consumption
Process: Can You Get There From Here?, in PHILOSOPHICAL AND RADICAL THOUGHT IN
MARKETING, supra note 90, at 217, 226, the table becomes a commodity filled with sym-
bolic import: "To the producer, its essence is profits; to the merchant, it has exchange
value; and to the owner, it might well be the essence of social status." Id. The table
contains its own power, apart from the agency of these three persons mentioned. Prod-
ucts embody the labor of persons, but post-industrial society sees these objects as though
value and life were inherent in them. See KOLAKOWSKI, supra note 97, at 276-77.
107. See OLLMAN, supra note 96, at 147.
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Products thus enter into relations with one another and with hu-
man beings.10s
It is impossible for human beings to reject the power of prod-
ucts over their lives, to opt out of the dominion of objects. For
Marx, every product carried with it a set of invariable and accept-
ed usages.1 9 These presumptions are part of the social world
that no individual can escape. Indeed, the very idea of a product
was for Marx a social construct: Only in a collective do individuals
understand what things are products and what to do with
them."0
In summary, the Marxist concept of industrialization explains
the traits of products liability law. Products liability requires manu-
facture, alienated labor, and products with power and autonomy of
their own. The last criterion calls for fuller discussion because it is
the power within products that supports a literal explanation of
their liability. In Sections B and C below, and later in Part III,
accordingly, I expand on the theme of products as autonomous
agents.
B. Objects as Symbols
Symbolic interactionism, a concept crystallized by George Her-
bert Mead"' and labeled by Herbert Blumer," z originated in
the pragmatic philosophy of William James."' Pragmatism found
a place betwden two extremes. For James, neither the Spencerian
account of behavior as constrained by social and geographical
determinism nor a contrary notion of pure autonomy explained the
relationship between the individual and society. James derived an
108. See AVINERI, supra note 101, at 119; see also CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, supra note 27,
at 126-30 (describing the relationship between certain products and human consciousness).
According to Professor Waldron, individuals are slaves, and products are masters. See
WALDRON, supra note 24, at 194.
109. See OLLMAN, supra note 96, at 147.
110. See AvINERI, supra note 101, at 82. In Wage Labour and Capital (1849), Marx
gave the example of the "small house." What is a small house? The same dwelling can
be an adequately-sized house so long as the other houses in the neighborhood are of
similar size. See id. at 80. See generally Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102
YALE L.J. 1 (1992) (analyzing relational preferences and their relationship to legal doc-
trine).
111. See LARRY T. REYNOLDS, INTERACTIONISM: EXPOSITION AND CRITIQUE 4
(1993).
112. Id. at 76.
113. Id. at 22.
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explanation of this relationship that acknowledged the force of
social order but also insisted on the active and creative nature of
the individual." 4
To the pragmatist, the destiny of a human being is not prede-
termined in group membership (as the Spencerians maintained)
nor in an innate autonomy. Human nature is grounded in the po-
tential of every person, and this potential can be realized only in
interaction."5 Arriving at this position, James and the early
pragmatists reflected the Hegelian disposal of dualistic definitions
of the social world and the mind. To pragmatists, the mind con-
stantly reinterprets itself as it looks at the world. 6 Other writers
built a connection between the philosophy of pragmatism and the
nascent discipline of sociology, creating what became known as the
Chicago School, during the first three decades of the twentieth
century."7 The central figure of this Chicago School was George
Herbert Mead, who shaped the theory of symbolic interactionism
from abstract ideas of pragmatism and thus connected pragmatic
philosophy to empirical reality.18
Society antedates the individual, Mead wrote, but individuals
"possess and control the world that [they] discover and in-
vent.""' 9 Hence the notion of interaction, whereby interpretation
and reflection and judgment of experience are mediated. Media-
tion takes place through language and symbols. Individuals act
towards other individuals and physical objects on the basis of the
symbolic meanings that those others have for the individual.'
114. See WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 254, 256-57 (1907).
115. See BERNARD N. MELTZER ET AL, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: GENESIS, VARI-
ETIES AND CRITICISM 7 (1975) [hereinafter SYMBOLIC INTERACrIONISM]; Bernard N.
Meltzer & Jerome G. Manis, Emergence and Human Conduct, 126 J. PSYCH. 333, 337
(1992).
116. See PAUL E. ROCK, THE MAKING OF SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM 60 (1979).
117. See SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM, supra note 115, at 8-27 (describing works of
"Chicago School" members Charles Horton Cooley, William I. Thomas, and John
Dewey). Charles Horton Cooley used the term "looking glass self" to argue that individ-
uals attempt to imagine the impression they make on others. See id. at 8-9; see also
CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 183-84 (2d ed.
1902).
118. See ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 620-22 (Rom Harre & Roger
Lamb eds., 1983).
119. George H. Mead, Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences, 33 INT'L J. ETHICS
229, 247 (1923).
120. See ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 118, at 620.
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Mead relied on several terms to express the process of sym-
bolic interaction. The self, a "realm of continual emergence,'''
engages in perpetual interpretation of symbolic meanings. Entities
interpreted are objects: Mead preferred to speak of objects rather
than stimuli,'2 perhaps to emphasize the contingent and varying
meanings of these objects. An object may be concrete or abstract.
A crucial element of interaction for Mead was role taking: an ima-
ginative reconstruction of attitudes of the other person, which
anticipates the behavior of the other."2 For example, a young
adult might attempt to imagine what a parent would think of his
new lover.' 4 The individual "cannot experience himself except
through the eyes and gestures of others."'"
Mead labeled the socialized, interpreting, imagining aspect of
the self the "Me," to indicate the sense in which individuals are
the object of interaction. Having seen glimpses of her persona
through the imagination of another point of view, the individual
acquires an organized concept of self in relation to others.'
Borrowing the Jamesian dichotomy of knower and known, Mead
also posited the existence of the "I." This aspect of the self is the
one that experiences impulses. Not fully socialized, the "I" repre-
sents the human potential for insurgency."
To Mead, the fundamental unit of social behavior was the act.
Later writers broke the act into subdivisions: perception of the
symbolic meaning of the object and subsequent manipulation-that
is, some form of action taken by the individual-followed by con-
summation. Meltzer, Petras, and Reynolds give an example of a
social act:
121. Mead, supra note 119, at 86.
122. See Herbert Blumer, Society as Symbolic Interaction, in HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND
SOCIAL PROCESSES 182 (Arnold M. Rose ed., 1962).
123. See ROBERT H. LAUER & WARREN H. HANDEL, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE
THEORY AND APPLICATION OF SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM 104-05, 114-16 (1983).
124. Id. at 104.
125. CALVIN J. LARSON, MAJOR THEMES IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 99 (1973).
126. See JOHN P. HEWIT', DILEMMAS OF THE AMERICAN SELF 53 (1989).
127. Id; see also SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM, supra note 115, at 41 (describing Mead's
description of the "I" as equivalent to the ego).
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Gesture [or object]: A friend waves to me from across the street.
Perception: I may interpret this as a friendly greeting on his/her
part. Or, since we had a violent argument only this morning, I
perceive it as sarcastic.
Manipulation: I wave back. Or, if I view the wave as sarcastic, I
may not wave back, but look in the other direction.
Consummation: We continue our separate ways. And the act
ends. But does it? The essence of social behavior, according to
Mead, is found in the fact that the meaning in any social act is
not inherent in the act itself, but is governed by the response of
the other person. The original gesture (a stimulus) did not deter-
mine what would happen (a response).... The cumulative na-
ture of behavior means that the latter response may serve as a
stimulus to the other individual and help to determine the nature
of his response to me the next time we encounter one anoth-
er. 
128
This bidirectional movement means that individuals are both
objects to others and interpreters of other objects; in Mead's view,
persons both control and are controlled simultaneously by their
environments. 29 In the example of the wave, whether the gesture
was hostile or friendly is a question that cannot be answered by
examination of the inherent nature of waves nor by the subjective
intent of the greeter or the greeted. But society invests the wave
with some meaning about which there is consensus: The individual
greeted would recognize the wave as some kind of communicative
gesture. Meanings are partly fixed and partly changing. 30
The consensus of meaning creates continuity in time. As the
scholar of symbolic interactionism Paul Rock points out, a person
is not the same being as he was in years past: "In a Heraclitean
sense, he is not even the same person from second to second."''
Language and objects create social continuity and permit social
organization to exist. 32 Hannah Arendt explored a similar theme
128. SYMBOLIC INTERACrIONISM, supra note 115, at 33-34 (citation omitted).
129. lId at 31.
130. Cf. CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 20, at 14 (stating that
objects tend to evoke consistent images over time and are more durable than other signs
such as ideas).
131. ROCK, supra note 116, at 113.
132. See EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, MEANING AND MODERNITY: SOCIAL THEORY
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when she wrote that people in their differences can achieve same-
ness through identification with the same object.133
Because they can appreciate the symbolic content of objects,
human beings are able to understand the idea of the future and
the past." According to Mead, the symbol takes the individual
out of the present.135 Among animals, only human beings are
known to have this capacity to understand symbolism. Mead con-
tended, for example, that a wolf looking at meat in a trap lacks
the concept of "bait." The wolf is trapped in the present because
it cannot take the role of a baiting human being.136 Symbolic in-
teraction thus helps to explain survival as well as the combination
of mobility and stability that permits social life to continue.
C. Products as a Priori Stimuli
As a simple example of symbolic interactionism in practice,
Mead used a man and a gorilla simultaneously looking at a ham-
mer. For both man and gorilla, the physical image on the retina is
the same; each one sees the object. But the "hammerness" of the
hammer is visible only to the man. 37 In the view of symbolic in-
teractionism, the individual perceives the object according to the
socially created meanings that it possesses.
I mention Mead's hammer to indicate my interest in a particu-
lar aspect of symbolic interactionism. Although symbolic inter-
actionists have contended that abstractions such as emotions or
religion can be objects that the individual perceives, 13 I want to
begin by focusing on concrete and tangible things-"objects" in
the ordinary-knowledge sense rather than jargon. Individuals em-
IN THE PRAGMATIC ATrTUDE 170 (1986) ("Symbols provided a means through which
humanity could free itself from immediate sensation and unconscious habit ...
133. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HuMAN CONDITION 137 (1958).
134. See 1 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 448
(Alexander C. Fraser ed., Clarendon Press 1894) (1689) (declaring that a person is a
being that "can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and
places").
135. See David L. Miller, Introduction to GEORGE H. MEAD, THE INDIVIDUAL AND
THE SOCIAL SELF 10-11 (David L. Miller ed., 1982) (paraphrasing Mead).
136. Id. at 11.
137. See id. at 133. As twentieth-century research has revealed that primates have a
high degree of skill in the use of tools, a contemporary writer might have substituted
another animal, such as a cat, for the gorilla.
138. See BLUMER, supra note 26, at 2; see also CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-
HALTON, supra note 20, at 14-16 (comparing abstractions and tangible objects).
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ploy objects or products (here I use the terms interchangeably) to
communicate; products also shape their identity. Tangible things
unite the disparate domains of symbolic interactionism and prod-
ucts liability law.
1. Products as Communication. People use products to com-
municate. One familiar form of communication is conspicuous
consumption-the flaunting of expensive items. Research tends to
support the widely held belief that individuals use products to
announce their increased wealth. 39 Jewelry, fur coats in tem-
perate climates, brands of automobiles known to be expensive yet
unreliable,"4 homes or offices with more space than their oc-
cupants can use, all communicate to onlookers a similar message.
There would be no market for certain products if people did not
need them as media of communication. Diamonds, though known
to be plentiful, are kept artificially scarce by monopolies;
expensive macadamia nuts are inferior in flavor and texture to
their cheaper counterparts. Expensive things announce transition to
greater wealth and status.
Other transitions are marked by communicative objects. Ado-
lescents use products such as cosmetics, cologne, hairspray, and
contact lenses to announce that they have become women and
men, or at least that they are no longer girls and boys. In her
popular book on etiquette, the social critic Judith Martin advised
recently divorced adults not to proclaim their transition with prod-
ucts clich6s-hair dye for women and red sports cars for men-on
139. The idea of conspicuous consumption was prominently expressed almost a century
ago. See THORSTEN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 70 (The Modem
Library, 1934) (1899). Some researchers find that status symbols have declined in number
and significance. See Russell E. Belk et al., Developmental Recognition of Consumption
Symbolism, 9 J. CONSUM. RES. 4, 5-6 (1982) (collecting sources).
140. Some Jaguar automobiles used to sport a bumper .sticker: "Ah, But When It
Runs. . ." And even a well-reputed make of automobile has symbolic as well as practical
value to its owner or driver. Grant McCracken tells the story of an unnamed University
of Chicago professor who insisted that he had bought a Volvo for purely utilitarian rea-
sons. To test this statement, McCracken offered the professor a deal: He, McCracken,
would purchase, maintain and insure another car, bringing the professor's transportation
costs to zero; the car would, however, be accoutered with "fur lining for the seats and
dashboard, a hood ornament that showed a rampant horse, and dice for the rear view
mirror." The professor refused the offer, claiming that these decorations made the car
"less useful to [him]." GRANT MCCRACKEN, CULTURE AND CONSUMPTION: NEW AP-
PROACHFS TO THE SyMBoLIc CQARACTER OF CONSUMER GOODS AND AcrnvmEs 145
(1988).
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the ground that these products overcommunicate the trait of sud-
den availability.'4' Black or white mourning clothes communicate
bereavement; a ring on the third finger of the left hand declares
marriage; in some circles, a man might announce his newly open
pride in being gay with an earring.
Professor Russell Belk has examined the phenomenon of pro-
ducts as communication with several innovative studies. His "de-
tective study" presented subjects with the purported contents of a
wallet found by the New York police department.'42 Subjects
were asked to draw inferences from the business cards, credit
cards, matchbooks, admission tickets and ballpoint pens inside the
wallet as well as the quality of the wallet itself. Belk found signifi-
cant agreement on the traits that these possessions expressed.'43
In a developmental study, Belk and his colleagues found that ele-
mentary school-between the second and sixth grades-is the time
when children learn to infer meanings from consumption choic-
es. 144
Students in psychology classes have participated in several
experiments designed to measure further the communicative func-
tion of personal possessions.'45 One of these studies asked col-
lege women to describe their own personalities, using adjectives,
and to put on the clothes that best expressed their personalities.
They were photographed in these outfits with their face and hair
blacked out. The students also listed the record albums that best
represented their personalities. Another group of students, the
raters, used these possessions to infer the personalities of the own-
ers. The study found significant agreement between self-ratings and
observer ratings.'" Other studies by the same researchers found
that observers regard possessions as conveying more information
about a person than behavioral cues,47 and that observers who
141. See JUDITH MARTIN, MISS MANNERS' GUIDE TO EXCRUCIATINGLY CORRECr
BEHAVIOR 559 (1982).
142. See Russell E. Belk, Assessing the Effects of Visible Consumption on Impression
Formation, 5 ADvANCES IN CONS. RES. 39 (1978).
143. Id at 42-44.
144. See Belk et al., supra note 139, at 13.
145. See W. Jeffrey Burroughs et al., Predicting Personality From Personal Possessions:
A Self-Presentational Analysis, 6 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 147 (1991).
146. Id. at 150-52. For a contrary finding, see Stuart J. McKelvie et al., Effects of
Offenders' and Victims' Characteristics on Severity of Punishment, 72 PSYcH. REP. 399,
401 (1993).
147. See Burroughs et al., supra note 145, at 156.
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relied first on products rather than behavioral cues were more
likely to describe the observed person in a way that agreed with
her self-description."4 Thus the products chosen by these individ-
uals said more about their personalities than their behavior.
Older empirical studies show that observers receive messages
from brands of beer,149 products used in grooming,15  and ciga-
rette brands,"' among many other products. These messages can
change over time, and consensus about what the product signifies
can disappear. Nonetheless, significant correlations between prod-
uct and concept continue to be identified. 2
2. Products as Shapers of Identity. Although most individuals
would admit readily that interaction with objects alters life, it is
perhaps less evident that objects are a part of one's self."5 3
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton suggest that "people are
what they attend to, what they cherish and use."'" They find
examples in history. Paleolithic artifacts may have been a force of
natural selection, favoring the survival of those who could and
would use them. The invention of the stirrup enabled knights to
wear full armor: an armor-wrapped knight could vanquish peasants
and maintain feudalism. Contraceptives and household appliances
decreased the amount of "psychic energy" needed for domestic
148. Id. at 157-60.
149. See James Gentry et al., Masculinity and Femininity Factors in Product Perception
and Self Image, 5 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 326 (1978).
150. See George E. Belch & E. Laird Landon, Discriminant Validity of a Product-
Anchored Self-Concept Measure, 14 J. MARKETING RES. 252, 253 (1977).
151. See Gentry et al., supra note 149.
152. Rebecca Holman pulls these studies together in her theory of product use as
communication. Holman argues that there are three necessary and sufficient conditions
for a product to be used as communication: visibility in use, variability in use, and
"personalizability." See Rebecca H. Holman, Product Use as Communication: A Fresh
Appraisal of a Venerable Topic, in REVIEW OF MARKETING 106, 107 (Ben M. Enis &
Kenneth J. Roering eds., 1981). In other words, observers must be able to see (or oth-
erwise perceive) the product; the product must vary slightly from user to user; and the
use of the product must be attributable to an individual. Id. Holman gives a hospital
"gown" as an example of a product that lacks variability; a product that lacks
personalizability is a costume worn in a play. Id. When products have all three traits,
they can communicate messages about their users. Id.
153. See CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 20, at 14-15; see also
Russell E. Belk, Extending Self and Extending Paradigmatic Perspective, 16 J. CONSUMER
RES. 129, 129 (1989) ("Possessions are part of the extended self in this society."). For a
related argument made in the legal literature, see Radin, Personhood, supra note 66.
154. CSmKzSENTMmiALY & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 20, at 16.
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tasks, leaving women free to seek new things that would help
them define who they are.155
Intellectual ancestry can be traced to William James, who
wrote that "a man's Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call
his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and
his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his
reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-
account."1 " Owners of possessions attach meanings to those
things. Later writers have elaborated on James' statement and
have measured, through empirical research, the degree of "self'
invested in possessions.
Investment of self in objects may be seen in cultural taboos
(in addition to laws) against forgery of art and plagiarism, as well
as the phenomenon of symbolic contamination: Chewed food and
used combs are considered disgusting, and there is virtually no
market for secondhand clothes worn close to their former owners,
such as underwear and socks.157 Religious practices unite selves
with objects: the most famous of these rituals is Christian commu-
nion. Virtually every division of the humanities and social scienc-
es-literature,"58  anthropology,'59  psychology," criminology,
155. l& at 45-46, 93. The association of industrialization and technology with freedom
for women is debatable. See, e.g., JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE
UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE 87-88 (1991) (reporting findings that time spent on
housework has increased since the introduction of household appliances); BARBARA
EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD 5-13 (1978) (arguing that in-
dustrializagon and antifeminist ideology are related phenomena); NAOMI WOLF, THE
BEAUTY MyTH: How IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST WOMEN 15, 22-24
(1991) (describing negative impact of industrialization on women).
156. 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 291 (1890).
157. Belk, supra note 153, at 149, 151-52.
158. Chosisme, an "all but stillborn literary movement," aspired to "portray human life
mainly in terms of the characters' acquisition, use, and disposal of objects, and not in
terms of an inner stream of consciousness or of a sequence of actions and events."
CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 20, at xi. See also infra text ac-
companying notes 163-65.
159. See MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFr: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN AR-
CHAIC SOCIETIES 10 (Ian Cunnison trans., 1967) ("The thing given [by Maoris] is not
inert. It is alive and often personified, and strives to bring to its original clan and home-
land some equivalent to take its place.") On product dynamism and symbolism present in
gift-giving, see MCCRACKEN, supra note 140, at 84-85; Pollack, supra note 28, at 1403.
160. See Rudmin, supra note 43; see also supra text accompanying notes 137-52.
161. See Elijah Anderson, The Code of the Streets, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1994, at
81, 88-89 (arguing that for gang members trophy objects "can symbolize the ability to
violate somebody-to 'get in his face,' to take something of value from him, to 'dis' him,
and thus to enhance one's own worth by stealing someone else's").
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as well as sociology--can provide examples of the investment of
self in objects. 62
Several Nobel laureates in literature share an interest in the
role of objects as sources and shapers of identity. In Being and
Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre wrote that the only way individuals
know who they are is by observing what they have. 63 Saul Bel-
low's Humboldt's Gift declares that the dead live through their
possessions left on earth, and that those possessions affect the
living."6 Toni Morrison, in The Bluest Eye, tells the harrowing
story of the effect of a doll on its young owner.65 In addition to
such literary flourishes, ordinary experience and observation sug-
gest that products shape selves. Travel souvenirs remind their
owners of their past and of their status as persons of the world. A
gun as frontier "equalizer" conveys the power of an object to
shape the self." People grieve over the loss or destruction of
objects that have no market value.6 7
Objects can remind their possessors of an ideal self in the
making. A small boy might express his craving for adulthood by
taking his father's pipe or razor, or playing with forbidden
things.s Objects also orient possessors toward a future that
looks brighter than present reality. For example, researchers found
that M.B.A. students who had predictors indicating a relatively low
chance of success in the job market used stereotypical products
such as attach6 cases, expensive pens, and conservative clothes
more frequently than their relatively successful classmates. The
men in the low-success category were also more likely to wear
their hair short and less likely to have mustaches or beards.69
162. For a dissenting view, see Joel B. Cohen, An Over-Extended Self?, 16 J.
CONSUMER RES. 125, 126-27 (1989) (arguing that concept of an "extended self" formed
by possessions lacks empirical identification, meaning, and explanatory power).
163. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 750-55 (Hazel E. Barnes
trans., Washington Square Press, Pocket Books 1966) (1943).
164. SAUL BELLOW, HUMBOLDT'S GrFr (1975).
165. TONI MORRISON, TiE BLUEST EYE (1970).
166. See Belk, supra note 153, at 145.
167. See Russell W. Belk, The Role of Possessions in Constructing and Maintaining a
Sense of Past, 17 ADvANCEs IN CONSUMER RES. 669, 674 (1990) (arguing that destruc-
tion of "important objects" causes the individual to lose a part of his past) (citation
omitted); Radin, Personhood, supra note 66, at 959 (describing attachment to wedding
rings, portraits, heirlooms, and houses).
168. ERNEST E. BOESCH, SYMBOLIC ACTION THEORY AND CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY
204 (1991).
169. ROBERT A. WICKLUND & PETER M. GOLLWITZER, SYMBOLIC SELF-COMPLETION
(Vol. 45:1
HOW CANA PRODUCT BE LIABLE?
Entire character traits-envy, acquisitiveness, materialism-ex-
press how much power possessions have over the identity of an in-
dividual. Awareness of the things or acquisitions of another helps
to determine what an individual wants. How possessions shape at-
titudes and tastes is a phenomenon frequently studied in social sci-
ence writing of interest to academic lawyers,70 especially those
who study the relationship between welfare economics and law.71
3. Products as Antecedent Stimuli. This discussion begins with
the insights of Michael Solomon, who approaches the role of products
as a priori stimuli through the discipline of symbolic
interactionism.' Professor Solomon begins by evaluating the
assumption prevalent in marketing scholarship-and in the law of
contracts and products liability as well-that products are responses to
antecedent needs. Consumer research generally addresses the decision
to purchase;' according to the prevailing view, the product is the
material satisfaction of a need. 4 While conceding the empirical
truth of this assumption, Solomon argues that it is not the whole
story: Products, he writes, "can play an a priori role as stimuli that
are antecedent to behavior."'7 Solomon builds on the marketing
literature discussed above that finds cues in the products used by
another individual. If I draw inferences from your cologne, or
152-55 (1982).
170. See, eg., JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 109-24 (1983) (combining psychological
concepts such as cognitive dissonance with assumptions present in economics).
171. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 461 n.2 (discussing envy); McAdams, supra note
110; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Cm. L. REv.
1129 (1986). The legal/philosophical genre of incommensurability is a related project, as it
also challenges presumptions of unitary valuation and stagnant tastes. See generally Cass
R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MicH. L. REv. 779, 781,
825-50 (1994) (offering examples of topics in law that would benefit from increased at-
tention to sources of valuation).
172. See Michael Solomon, The Role of Products as Social Stimul" A Symbolic.
Interactionism Perspective, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 319 (1983).
173. See JOEL R. EvANS & BARRY BERMAN, MARKETING (4th ed. 1990).
174. Contract law emphasizes autonomous decisionmaking and usually assumes that a
buyer or consumer knows what she wants and thus enters into a transaction to fulfill
that want. The contrary theme of consumer protection is premised on the idea that this
autonomy must be augmented by the expansion of consumer choice: For example, buyers
are sometimes allowed to rescind certain contracts within a few days after the contract is
made. Beyond this point, according to prevailing contract theory, lies paternalism. See
Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE LJ. 997,
1027 (1985).
175. See Solomon, supra note 172, at 322.
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clothing, or automobile,"6 and these same products have similar
meanings for me as I attempt to explain and understand my-
self,1" then the products may stimulate my behavior.78 Solomon
illustrates his point with a diagram. '79
FIGuRE 1
BI-DIRECIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRODUCTS AND CONSUMERS
Antecedent Motivation Result
Products as self-image---+ need arousal -+ need satisfaction
responses product purchase
(traditional view) impression management
Products as product -+ role definition -+ self-attribution
stimuli symbolism situational self-image
(Solomon proposal) role performance
A simple application of this idea is dramaturgical: The individ-
ual responds to products as stimuli when she finds herself in a set-
ting filled with meaning-laden objects.' She acts differently in a
McDonald's franchise than she would in a gourmet restaurant."'
Products set the state of behavior; individuals respond.
Objects shape and communicate identity as indicated in Figure
1. The business student with a shaky place in graduate school sees
the brand-name pen or briefcase and is reminded of an uncertain
176. See supra text accompanying notes 139-52.
177. See Michael Solomon, Deep-Seated Materialism: The Case of Levi's 501 Jeans, 13
ADVANCES IN CONSUMER P.ES. 619, 621 (1986) (arguing that Levi's jeans perform social
and psychological functions such as personalization and facilitation of social role-playing).
178. Professor Kilbourne makes a similar point:
Though the direction of the process relating products to people is, in contempo-
rary marketing, generally considered to be people creating products, there is
substantial historic and contemporary precedent for considering the logical flow
to be bidirectional, with products also contributing to the development of peo-
ple.
Kilbourne, supra note 106, at 225-26.
179. Solomon, supra note 172, at 323.
180. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 126-28,
135-36 (1953).
181. Similarly, the cues present in a stadium might contribute to a riot. Solomon
offered these examples to me in a letter. Letter from Michael Solomon to Anita
Bernstein (undated) (on file with the author).
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future. Product symbolism makes the student think of success and
confidence. This antecedent leads to what Solomon calls "motiva-
tion"; the student seeks a more secure situational self-image. Own-
ing the pen or briefcase leads to self-attribution. McCracken's
professor saw a Volvo and wanted one, but recoiled at *he thought
of receiving, for free, the use of a car just because of its decora-
tive touches.1" Teenagers will work with extraordinary energy to
acquire the right sportswear or cosmetics: prior observation of
products tells them how these items conduce to their selfhood.
As this discussion suggests, products function as symbols most
strikingly in a world of advanced industrialization, because only
this setting can provide a context in which each product is known
not to be unique. The bidirectional relationship of Figure 1 pre-
supposes a market economy, with well-developed exchange and
also a background of advertisement, to create shared notions of
what a product means. Every product, as Erich Fromm once ex-
plained, is both unique and general, concrete and abstract:" the
abstract nature of the product always predominates in the con-
sumption relationship. And when a product is an antecedent stimu-
lus, it acts as an abstraction." During the post-industrial era in
the United States, when the abstract significance of manufactured
products began to overcome their status as concrete, physical ob-
jects," both product dynamism and products liability grew in
force.Y6
182. See MCCRACKEN, supra note 140.
183. Kilbourne, supra note 106, at 225 (citing ERICH FROMM, THE SANE SOCIETY 114
(1955)).
184. See i. Another writer speaks of the "utter triumph of abstract value" within the
consumer culture. STUART EWEN, ALL CONSUMING IMAGES: THE POLITICS OF STYLE IN
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 159 (1988).
185. See Kilbourne, supra note 106, af 222 (arguing that Americans "are far more
interested in the symbolic aspects of products than the physical aspects") (citation omit-
ted).
186. The Fromm distinction between concreteness and abstractness, or uniqueness and
generality, of a product, see id., has a counterpart in products liability doctrine that dis-
tinguishes between production or maufacturing defects on the one hand, and defects
based on the seller's deliberate decisions, including marketing and design, on the other.
When a product fails to conform to specifications, its uniqueness is at issue. Claims al-
leging defective marketing or design involve a more abstract idea of the product. See,
e.g., Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 580 (Ohio 1981) (allowing
punitive damages against manufacturer based on strongly evocative, colorful advertising
when design did not provide safety features commensurate with this portrayal).
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II. PRODUCr DYNAMISM IN LEGAL DocTRINE
The law of industrialized nations, especially American law,
recognizes product dynamism. This understanding takes several
forms of expression. In this Part, I address the numerous areas of
law that regard nonhumans as animate sources of agency: Some of
this recognition is metaphoric, and much of it extends past meta-
phor. As I have argued, the development of products liability law
beginning in the American industrial era is another acknowledg-
ment of the powers in products. For additional examples, I move
ahead to the 1980s, surveying the attention paid to products that
are deemed lost to liability doctrine.
Revealing images attribute vital properties to nonhuman ac-
tors. These metaphors ultimately do not relieve human beings of
responsibility because the connection between things and human
choices is acknowledged. They help, however, to explain the devel-
opment, and persistence, of a unique legal doctrine for products.
A. The Object as Wrongdoer
The term fait de la chose, approved in France in 1897,"8 ac-
knowledges figuratively that there can be an "act of the thing," for
which the civil liability system might blame any of several human
beings."s Fait de la chose regards the control over an object as
having more than one possible source. Any type of gardien, or
keeper, might be a defendant in a products liability action. The
gardien de la structure, or keeper of the internal dynamism, is
generally the producer of a manufactured product; the gardien du
comportement is an owner, keeper, or operator. 89 From fait de la
187. See Hessel E. Yntema, The Law of Obligations, in CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN
WORLD 58, 69-70 (Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos ed., 1963); CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] art.
1384 (Fr.).
188. Yntema, supra note 187, at 70; see also STEPHANE GRUBER-MAGITOT, L'ACrION
DU CONSUMMATEUR CONTRE LE FABRICANT D'UN OBJET AFFECTg PAR UN VICE
CACHt 98-99 (1978). "La doctrine est partagde," adds Gruber-Magitot, id. at 100 n.1; but
whether or not fait de la chose is currently used to resolve most products liability dis-
putes in France, its analytical contribution to products liability law remains powerful.
189. As Jolowicz elaborates,
[T]he person who acquires a product acquires the garde only of its behavior
(comportement); garde of its structure remains with the person best able to
know its internal properties and composition. It follows, for example, that [in
certain cases] it is sufficient for the victim to prove that his damage was caused
by the "structure" of the thing-he need not even prove defect, let alone fault.
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chose, a strict variation of products liability has evolved in some
European nations.' 90
The idea of the act of a thing exists also in American prod-
ucts liability doctrine and its English antecedents. For example,
many subconcepts of products liability law isolate products as dis-
tinct from human beings and the corporations that employ them.
Statutes of repose posit a radical separation between product and
maker: After a period of years, these statutes disconnect products
from their manufacturers by terminating the attribution of a flaw
to the producer. This severance asserts that although a defective
product may cause harm, the passage of years gathers all of this
responsibility into the product itself (or onto another person) and
away from the manufacturer. The theory behind breach of war-
ranty avoids reference to manufacturer misconduct: It is the thing
itself that must be merchantable or fit for a purpose, with little
room for excuses. These doctrines are conventionally explained in
terms of policy, not illustrations of the product as wrongdoer, but
their emphasis on the object itself rather than individual or aggre-
gate human conduct echoes fait de la chose.
The notion of the product as wrongdoer also illuminates
caselaw that purports to reconcile "strict liability" with "fault," and
it can accommodate other products-liability concepts, such as puni-
tive damages or comparative negligence, that depend on fault.'9'
Rationales commonly used to apply comparative negligence to
strict liability are illuminating. Most commentators want to permit
the two concepts to coexist,' 92 and they struggle for a coherent
analytical connection. One approach analogizes strict products
liability to negligence per se. 93 Another rationale, with some
Jolowicz, supra note 8, at 376 (citations omitted).
190. See Frank A. Orban, III, Product Liability: A Comparative Legal Restatement-
Foreign National Law and the EEC Directive, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 342, 349-50
(1978) (describing strict products liability derived from French interpretation in France,
Belgium, and Luxembourg).
191. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986) (punitive dam-
ages), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162
(Cal. 1978) (comparative negligence).
192. Although some writers have contended that fault-based doctrines and strict prod-
ucts liability "will not mix," it is widely agreed that this argument has not withstood
analysis. See David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICHl.
L. REv. 1257, 1268-70 & nn.47-54 (1976).
193. Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1967), was the first expression of this
1995]
DUKE LAW JO URNAL
sophistry, finds "social fault" in marketing defective products or
"legal fault" derived from a breach of duty to market products
without defects. 94 Other efforts simply dodge the question of
comparison." 5 The approaches rely either on stretching the con-
cept of fault beyond its natural meaning or on denying the prob-
lem of logical compatibility. It is actually less farfetched to envi-
sion the product itself as a kind of wrongdoer. This concept pre-
serves the notion of fault that must complement fault-based rem-
edies and defenses while acknowledging that the product is distinct
from its maker.
Apart from products liability doctrine, the object-as-wrongdoer
approach of fait de la chose has other important analogies in
American law. Fait de la chose derives from principles of liability
for harms caused by animals.'96 The idea that nonhuman actors
could be causal agents made French courts receptive to the idea
that a thing also could act. English and American courts did not
make this connection expressly, but modem products liability law,
being "strict," traces its lineage to this older form of strict liability.
Animals and products occupy a unique place in an account of
causation of harm. Semi-autonomous,"9 they cause injury only
derivatively, and what they "do" is a manifestation of a human
omission or act. Their connection to human conduct must be ac-
knowledged for both corrective-justice reasons of attributing re-
sponsibility and for the policy of compensating a victim. But the
incompleteness of that connection is expressed lexically in the term
rationale. See also West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976) ("Strict
liability means negligence as a matter of law or negligence per se."); Atkins v. American
Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134, 139-42 (Ala. 1976). For cases analogizing strict products
liability to negligence per se, see Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 471
(NJ. 1986); Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280, 285 (Me. 1984). But see
Young's Machine Co. v. Long, 692 P.2d 24, 25 n.1 (Nev. 1984); Wenatchee Wenoka
Growers Assoc. v. Krack Corp., 576 P.2d 388, 391 (Wash. 1978), which both explicitly
reject the Dippel formulation.
194. See David A. Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence,
43 Mo. L. REv. 431, 442 (1978).
195. See id. at 444-47 (describing and criticizing "comparative causation" approach);
see also id. at 449-50 (offering Professor Fischer's preferred resolution, reducing plaintiff's
recovery in proportion to his own fault).
196. See Yntema, supra note 187, at 69-70.
197. Cf Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Consumers and Their Animal Companions, 20 3.
CONSUMER REs. 616, 624 (1994) (discussing theory that companion animals mediate be-
tween nature and culture and, because of their semihuman status, must not be intention-
ally abandoned or consumed as food).
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strict liability, implying that in one sense the person-defendant was
not at fault.
Illustrations of this point may be found in ancient legal codes.
Mosaic law provided a death penalty-stoning-for the ox that
gored a man or a woman, causing the person's death."8 Normal-
ly the owner would not be punished, but if the owner knew of the
propensity of the ox to gore and did not keep the animal re-
strained, the owner also faced a penalty when the ox caused the
death of a human being. 9 Again human conduct is linked with,
but also separated from, the errant activity of the nonhuman
wrongdoer. As in modem strict liability, the owner of the injuring
animal (like the manufacturer of a product) cannot escape respon-
sibility even when the victim does not prove fault; yet the
defendant's conduct is pertinent, increasing or decreasing his culpa-
bility for the injury. The Biblical rule parallels the modem doc-
trine that a manufacturer is strictly liable for harms caused or
occasioned by its product, and can be liable additionally (under a
separate count of negligence or for punitive damages) if the plain-
tiff can prove fault.
The fact that inanimate objects can be wrongdoers is not an
unfamiliar concept in medieval law, which provided occasionally
for their punishment:
Probably to the primitive mind the ox that gored a man, the
sword that slew, and the murderer that wielded it were much
more on one level than they can be to us. The animal or tool, if
not conscious themselves, might be endued with a magic power
or possessed with an evil spirit. It was well to get rid of them
before they did more harm.'
The English law of deodands, a topic that Oliver Wendell
Holmes regarded as essential, attributed blame to an object that
198. See Exodus 21:28.
199. Penalties ranged from a fine to execution of the owner. See Exodus 21:29-32.
The Code of Hammurabi was more lenient:
If a man's ox were known to gore, and he had been notified that it was a
gorer, and he have not wound up its horns, and have not shut it up, and the
ox gore a free-born man, and kill him, he shall pay one-half mina of silver.
THE CODE OF HAMMUtRAI No. 251, reprinted in SOURCEs OF ANCIENT AND PRIMiTIVE
LAw 387, 436 (Albert Kocourek & John H. Wigmore eds., 1915).
200. Richard R. Cherry, Primitive Criminal Law, in PRIMrTvE AND ANCIENT LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 122, 143 (Albert Kocourek & John H. Wigmore eds., 1915).
1995]
44 DUKELAWJOURNAL [Vol. 45:1
was the direct agent of a person's death.2"1 Under the law of
deodands, the value of the harm-causing object was assessed, and
this amount was payable to the Crown.2" Holmes gave the ex-
ample of a cart as a thing that could be viewed as the agent of a
man's death and forfeited. 3 A tree that fell and killed a person
was to be "executed, its corpse delivered to the person's kinsmen
to chop up and put to revengeful and beneficial use at the
hearth." 4
To some writers, notably former Justice Brennan, the modem
law of forfeiture is derived from deodands 05 Whether this asso-
ciation is correct as a matter of history is disputed,206 but forfei-
ture shares the theme of personification of objects. Admiralty for-
feiture, in particular, insists that a ship has a distinct personifica-
tion. In two nineteenth-century admiralty cases, Justice Story up-
held in rem actions against ships where actions against persons did
not lie.' The vessel, Story wrote, "is treated as the offender, as
the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches." 208
201. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 24-25 (1881).
202. Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169,
185 (1973).
203. HOLMES, supra note 201, at 25.
204. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing Revisited: How Far Will Law
and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 38 (1985) (discussing
example from Holmes's THE COMMON LAW). Professor Stone's thesis is probably the
best-known precedent in legal scholarship for the animist strain in my argument. See
generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? (1975).
Sources of ancient Greek law indicate that the Greeks tried and punished nonhu-
man wrongdoers, as well as unidentified human criminals, at the king's court at the
Prytaneion. Animals, inanimate objects, and unknown killers were prosecuted at this
court. It is not clear exactly how these trials took place, but there could be no presenta-
tion of a defense except possibly in cases where an animal might be defended by its
owner. The penalty imposed on inanimate objects was to be cast from the city, while the
penalty for animals was probably execution and expulsion of the corpse. Marilyn A. Katz,
Ox-Slaughter and Goring Oxen: Homicide, Animal Sacrifice and Judicial Process, 4 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 249, 269-70 (1992).
205. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974).
206. See Tamara R. Piety, Comment, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil
Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 911, 919 n.36
(1991).
207. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827); United States v. Brig Malek
Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844). In Brig Malek Adhel, the ship's captain committed
acts of piracy against other ships. The vessel's owners were not held liable for the acts
of the captain. Nonetheless, Story held that their ship could be forfeited.
208. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. at 233.
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Current statutory law requires the forfeiture of boats involved in
the violation of customs laws.
Like modem products liability law, deodands and its progeny
have been attacked as preposterous fictions, devised with a cynical
purpose in mind. According to some abolitionist writing about pro-
ducts liability, a separate doctrine exists to perpetuate a livelihood
for lawyers, and makes no conceptual sense.210 In a similar anal-
ysis, Blackstone once described deodands as a crude superstition
that the English government invoked to tax its subjects.21'
Deodands is, of course, as obsolete as a legal notion can be, and
strict products liability may follow it into oblivion. The idea of
animation behind both concepts, however, continues to reso-
nate.212 And as the legal historians Pollock and Maitland have
suggested, it will endure as long as human beings feel impelled to
curse the chairs over which they stumble.2 3
B. Grieving for Lost Products
Using the metaphors of abandonment, sacrifice, and loss,214
some writers who study products liability demonstrate their belief
that products are animated by a kind of life force. The cessation
of a line of goods attributable to liability concerns can provoke
expressions of bereavement. The difference between products with-
drawn for reasons not based on liability and products "driven from
the market"21 5 appears to parallel the difference between natural
209. See 19 U.S.C. § 1594 (1988).
210. See Wheeler, supra note 9, at 23.
211. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 289-92 (1966).
212. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Ancient Law and The Punishment of Corporations:
Of Frankpledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. REV. 307 (1991) (applying ancient legal con-
cepts of personification to the problem of corporate criminal liability).
213. See FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 474 (2d ed. 1899).
214. See HUBER, LIABILITY, supra note 14, at 207-08; Man C. Maloo & Benjamin A.
Neil, Products Liability Exposure: The Sacrifice of American Innovation, 13 J. PROD.
LIA. 361, 362-63 (1991); Randolph J. Stayin, The U.S. Product Liability System: A Com-
petitive Advantage to Foreign Manufacturers, 14 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 193, 205 (1988) (listing
"abandoned" products).
215. Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for
Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L REv. 853, 878 (1983). Professor Page is not a griever.
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death and death by violence.216 Bad things, reform proponents
appear to argue, happen to good products because of liability.
Grieving for lost products has come from varied quarters.
According to one business-sponsored survey of manufacturing
executives, 47% of American manufacturers have withdrawn prod-
ucts from the market, and 25% have discontinued research be-
cause of liability concerns.217 A conference at the Brookings In-
stitution produced Huber and Litan's The Liability Maze, a collec-
tion of papers assembled to demonstrate the proposition that lia-
bility harms innovation and prevents valuable products from reach-
ing the market.2 8 In a well-publicized 1991 speech, then-Vice
President Dan Quayle told an audience of lawyers that the Ameri-
can liability system discouraged the marketing of useful and de-
sired products.219
Liability, according to those who grieve, eliminates products
from the market in at least three ways. First, it obstructs innova-
tion that would otherwise bring new technologies to the fore. Se-
cond, it militates at the margin against the marketing of a new
product. Third, it causes managers to decide to cease manufacture
of existing products. The first category, products never made be-
cause of the decline in innovation, is said to include contracep-
tives' (sparse research into new technologies has been taking
place in the last decades) and, in general, any product to be used
mainly by younger persons in good health."2 It also includes vac-
cines and general aviation.' The second, products known to
have been created that were not marketed, includes miscellany
such as certain new vaccines,' a drug called Oculinum, 4 a
216. The loss of a product due to the regulatory ban of an agency may be analogized
to execution after due process of law.
217. See E. Patrick McGuire, The Impact of Product Liability, 908 CONF. BD. RES.
REP. 20 (1988).
218. See THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND
INNOVATION (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991). See also Maloo & Neil,
supra note 214 (subtitled, The Sacrifice of American Innovation). Huber has said that
while preparing the book he contacted business organizations in search of authors he
knew would write that liability concerns were "killing innovation." Kenneth Jost, Tam-
pering with Evidence, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1992, at 45, 47-48.
219. See Queenan, supra note 34, at C1-C2.
220. See Gina Kolata, Will the Lawyers Kill Off Norplant?, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995,
at A3, A5.
221. See STEVEN GARBER, PRODUC LIABILITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF
PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL SERVICES 166 (1993).
222. See HUBER, LIABILrY, supra note 14, at 156, 161.
223. See Huber, Safety, supra note 14, at 289-90.
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substitute for asbestos,' a turbo-charged rotary engine for gen-
eral aviation,' and a child safety rail.' The third category,
products withdrawn because of liability, has received the most
attention. In martyrdom are Bendectin, the morning sickness
drug; Copper-7, the intrauterine device withdrawn by Sear-
le; 9 the CJ-5 and CJ-7 model Jeeps once made by American
Motors,I °  and the Puritan-Bennett anesthesia gas machine '
Writers have also identified imperiled products: certain contracep-
tives, 2 2 motorcycles, 33  and antidepressants such as Prozac,
among others.' Even those who are habitual lamenters, howev-
er, have agreed that certain consumer items deserved to go to
products-liability hell 5
In grieving for lost products, writers demonstrate some impor-
tant features of product dynamism. The grieving posture favors the
abstract, symbolic nature of products rather than their unique-
224. See Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation of
Pharmaceuticals, 103 HARV. L. REV. 773, 774 (1990). Oculinum was eventually approved
by the FDA and brought to market.
225. See Richard J. Mahoney, Time to Unshackle U.S. Competitive Strengths, SCI. AM.,
May 1990, at 136.
226. See Stayin, supra note 214, at 205.
227. See Evelyn Gilbert, Product Liability Woes Keep Juvenile Products Off Market,
NAT'L UNDERWRITER Co. REP., Mar. 11, 1991 at 1.
228. See Huber, Safety, supra note 14, at 333 n.196; Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin
Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992).
229. See W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship Between
Product Liability and Innovation, in TORT LAW IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETrON,
INNOVATION AND CONSUMER WELFARE 105, 112 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) [hereinafter
TORT LAW].
230. Kevin Klose, A U.S. Era Ends: Last Jeep is Built-It's Taps for Popular World
War II Vehicle, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1986, at A3.
231. See Michael Brody, When Products Turn Into Liabilities, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 1986,
at 22; Dan Quayle, Now is the Time for Product Liability Reform, Daily Rep. for Exec.
(BNA) No. 59 (Mar. 27, 1990).
232. See Albert G. Thomas, Jr. & Stephanie M. LeMelle, The Norplant System: Where
Are We in 1995?, 40 J. FAM. PRAC. 125 (1995).
233. See Where's Sen. Campbell?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 24, 1994, at 48A
(attributing concern about the motorcycle industry to Colorado senator).
234. See Peter W. Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, FORBES, July 8, 1991, at 68,
70 (discussing spermicides and Prozac, among others).
235. See, e.g., HUBER, LIABILrY, supra note 14, at 162 (approving of loss of Dalkon
Shield). Unlamented products lost to liability include the Corvair, the Pinto, thalidomide,
Procter & Gamble's Rely tampon, the Firestone 500 tire, three-wheeled all-terrain vehi-
cles for children, the Bork-Shiley heart valve, and hot-water vaporizers. See Tom
Christoffel, The Role of Law in Reducing Injury, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 7, 12
(1989); Claybrook, supra note 15, at 1178.
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ness. 6 Because writers who grieve are committed to markets
and the concomitant chance that any individual product will leave
the market if consumers reject it 7 they do not argue that the
loss of a product per se is an occasion for regret. Instead, they
regard the lost product in terms of its symbolism. "Innovation" as
a casualty of liability doctrine is the most abstract loss of all: The
griever cannot say what unique item is lost, but instead regrets the
wounding of a principle. Products known to have existed that were
never marketed are almost equally abstract entities. 8 The reader
is asked to join in grieving products, even though she has never
seen or touched any of the enumerated objects. Would they have
worked well? Who is worse off for their absence? Appeals to com-
petitiveness in world markets, 9 a theme often favored by those
who grieve, also invoke abstractions rather than tangible things.
The lament for lost products, like product dynamism, is sited
firmly in post-industrial consumer culture. Those who regret the
passing of a particular product, or a general deprivation such as
the threat posed to innovation, express their argument in terms of
lost consumer choice in a world where more choices necessarily
means more happiness. However, alternative reasons do exist to
mourn the passing of a product. The product could have been the
best at its function, making competing products unnecessary. Its
manufacture could have provided employment within a region. It
might have been aesthetically pleasing, ritually significant, inspir-
ing, humorous, or useful to basic research. The products-lost-to-
liability literature downplays these arguments. Its writers stay firm-
ly within the tradition of consumer sovereignty, even though con-
sumer sovereignty can destroy products more cruelly than any
other force.
In urging the reader to agree that liability is to blame for lost
products, writers frame the subject in terms that Marx himself
might have used. To these writers, decisionmaking looms from
above: Government and capital wrestle over liability and its costs,
while the individual must remain a passive spectator and recipient.
In the "grieving" literature, it is never urged that homo faber
236. See supra notes 183-86.
237. See Lawrence M. Fisher, Plug is Pulled on Heathkits, Ending a Do-it-Yourself
Era, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1992, at Al (describing removal of a product due to sales
decline and loss in market advantages).
238. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
239. See Stayin, supra note 214, at 193.
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decide what he needs and organize to get his products made. Nor
is the consumer encouraged to free himself from wanting to be
nurtured by consumer products, whose supply might be erratic.2'
His labor is entirely irrelevant to design and strategy; he can only
queue up in the market. Even there, he may be overcome by
more potent forces that will nullify his sovereign desire to pur-
chase by removing a product. Ideas about where power and deci-
sionmaking lie are much the same within tort-reform writing and
Marxist polemics. Grieving for lost products, like metaphors of
animation in legal doctrine, illustrates the radical separation be-
tween conduct and thing.24
III. PRODUCT DYNAMISM AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The symbolic properties of products, which create product dy-
namism, suggest that products liability exists independently, sepa-
rate from human-agency bases of liability grounded in tort and
contract. Put another way, product dynamism implies products
liability. Further implications follow, pertaining to the liability of
persons, who are the only entities capable of paying for injury
within a civil liability system 42
The theory of product dynamism does not answer doctrinal
questions of liability in yes-no fashion any more than does the
conventional understanding of products liability. Instead, product
dynamism is a variable, strongly present in some configurations of
240. The Marxist philosopher Herbert Marcuse was among the first thinkers to exhort
his listeners and readers to free themselves from the control of consumer markets. See
Douglas Kelner, Advertising and Consumer Culture, in QUESTIONING THE MEDIA 242,
253 (John Downing et al. eds., 1990).
241. As a final illustration of this point, compare the grieving-for-products commentary
with popular and academic writing about refusals to provide services such as medical
care. The two types of regret are different. Perhaps the most important distinction is that
services are conceived as phenomena that do not completely disappear, they may become
less available, but a determined patient can find an obstetrician, for example, and parents
will track down a source of child care. Liability raises the price of services but does not
eliminate them. When services are diminished, moreover, consumers who miss them know
that they may well return later when the individuals who provide them are placated by
changes in their perceived liability exposure or when new providers enter the market.
Usually it is cheaper to enter or reenter the market of services than to launch a new
product. A withdrawn product is much less likely to return. A product that was never
marketed because of fears of liability exposure is also unlikely to be revived. The prod-
uct thus remains a unique entity.
242. Cf Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV.
235, 256 (1914) ("A machine cannot be 'in fault' in the same sense as a man.").
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user-maker-product, and weak or absent in others. Where the
quantity of dynamism is great, and injury results, the situation
presents what I have designated "true products liability." Where
product dynamism is absent or attenuated, yet the conventional
elements of products liability-something that is labeled a product,
a business-defendant, and injury-exist, the situation presents
"nominal products liability." Traditional concepts, primarily negli-
gence and warranty, explain nominal products liability, whereas
true products liability is reserved for a smaller set of cases.
The distinction between true and nominal products liability
helps to illuminate debates that are both conceptual and practical.
Conceptual questions have been pressing for decades. If, for in-
stance, "policy bases" justify the existence of a separate doctrine
for something labeled products liability,243 then it becomes im-
portant to say which types of injuries fit within these desired poli-
cy bases. Even without the justification of policies, the nominal
category exists, and both doctrine and commentary have not ad-
dressed the problem of drawing a line around it.
At a practical or doctrinal level, courts and litigants have
grappled with the problem of scope. Does products liability apply,
for instance, to situations involving the simultaneous delivery of a
service and a product? Categories of defendants raise a similar
question-retailers being the major example of a category whose
place in "products liability" has been challenged.2' Resellers, in-
stallers, and trademark licensors have also disputed their place in a
products liability scheme; and caselaw offers little guidance.245
243. See Thomas A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L
REv. 1077 (1965).
244. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171-72 (Cal. 1964) (Traynor,
J.) (declaring that strict liability for retailers serves insurance, incentives to safety, and
loss-spreading purposes); see also John G. Culhane, Real and Imagined Effects of Statutes
Restricting the Liability of Nonmanufacturing Sellers of Defective Products, 95 DIcK. L.
REV. 287 (1991) (presenting arguments for and against strict liability for retailers); Wil-
liam C. Powers, Jr., Distinguishing Between Products and Services in Strict Liability, 62
N.C. L REv. 415, 426 n.49 (1984) (arguing that liability of retailers may no longer be
justified by traditional rationales).
245. Compare Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 791 P.2d 1303, 1307 (Idaho 1990)
(holding that there is no strict liability on the part of seller of used product) with
Thompson v. Rockford Mach. Tool Co., 744 P.2d 357, 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (hold-
ing that § 402A applies to dealers of used products), review denied, 110 Wash. 2d 1007
(1988); compare Yost v. Fuscaldo, 408 S.E.2d 72, 78 (W. Va. 1991) (holding that strict
liability is not applicable to installer who lacks specialized skill to modify product) with
Dietrich v. Allstate Ins. Co., 540 So. 2d 358, 361 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (determining that
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The growth of products liability legislation-vast state-level
lawmaking 4  as well as proposals in Congress247-gives rise to
questions of statutory interpretation. What exactly is a products
liability action? Separate statutes of limitation often apply to prod-
ucts liability cases.2 One state legislature even attempted to re-
quire victorious plaintiffs in products liability actions (and only
products liability actions) to turn over to the state a share of any
punitive damages they recover.24 9 Products liability is also men-
tioned by name in a variety of legislative packages?' ° The pros-
pect of congressional lawmaking in this area suggests problems of
comprehensiveness and preemption: Which cases fit within the fed-
eral law, and which lie outside it?"' Although statutes often at-
tempt to define "product" or "products liability," 2  they do not
effectively anticipate problems of interpretation. Quasi-legislative
measures such as the UCC and the Second Restatement also fail to
pool installer could be liable on strict products liability theory), cert. denied, 541 So. 2d
898 (La. 1989); compare Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 786 P.2d 939, 943
(Ariz. 1990) (holding that licensor is strictly liable) with Tyler v. Pepsico, 400 S.E.2d 673,
675-76 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that licensor is not strictly liable).
246. Henderson and Twerski provide a state-by-state chart indicating that all 50 states
undertook tort reform in the years 1986-1991, with products liability law significantly
changed in California, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mich-
igan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Texas, and Utah. See HENDERSON &
TWERsKI, supra note 18, at 859-62. In the history of products liability within the Ameri-
can federal system, only the UCC and § 402A of the Restatement engendered this much
change.
247. The bill currently pending is H.R. 917, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), dubbed the
"Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act."
248. For cases where the survival of a claim depended on whether a products liability
statute of limitation applied, see Walls v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 832 F. Supp. 1467
(M.D. Fla. 1993); Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 798 F. Supp. 301 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
249. See McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990)
(striking down Georgia statute requiring victorious plaintiffs to remit 75% of punitive
damages received in products liability actions to the state treasury); see also H.R. 917,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(c)(3) (1995) (requiring victorious plaintiffs to deposit 85% of
punitive damages received into government fund).
250. See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 18, at xxix-xxx.
251. See Andrew Blum, Tort Reform: Camel's Nose Into State Law, NAT'L L.J., Mar.
20, 1995, at Al, A22.
252. Several states have defined "product" for purposes of strict liability in their stat-
utes. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-681 (1982); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-102
(Michie 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001 (1989); IDAHO CODE § [6-1402] 6-1302
(1990); ILL REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-213 (1989 & Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 33-1-1.5-2 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); MD. CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-311
(1995); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71 (Anderson 1991); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-28-102 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010 (West 1992).
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say exactly what territory products liability occupies. True and
nominal products liability, then, should be separated from each
other before the law of products liability can become intelligible.
A. True Products Liability
The "true" products liability paradigm involves three ac-
tors-product, user, and maker. They are united functionally by a
set of interrelated expressions of agency, and all three impose
dynamic force on the others. This relationship can be described
using the figure of a triangle:
FIGURE 2





Advertising; inducement 0 -
Maker Demand; expression of preferences User
Each agent--either maker, product, or user-stimulates needs
and responds to cues from the other two agents. This interaction is
misunderstood in prevailing visions of products liability. Some con-
ventional understandings regard the user as agent, the maker as
recipient of the user's agency (later the maker becomes the defen-
dant, the respondent, party B sued by A), and the product as an
incidental connection between the two. Alternatively, the maker is
often viewed as agent, acting upon a victim. Both economic ana-
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lysts and abolitionist critics see products liability almost entirely in
bipolar terms-the product is so incidental as not to be of interest,
since all that is ever at issue in a products liability case is human
conduct. 3 The only relationship present, according to almost all
writers and observers, is the one between the injured claimant and
the seller-defendant. Thus, the schema displayed in Figure 2 differs
sharply from other explanations of products liability, not only in
its attribution of agency to the product, but its insistence that the
three agents are united in a relationship of mutual influence and
power.
The terms in Figure 2 need to be defined. Toward this end,
caselaw and academic commentary is partially helpful, especially to
identify the salient traits of a "product." But because courts and
commentators have sought to identify appropriate defendants in a
bipolar scheme rather than to separate product and maker in re-
cognition of their discrete status as agents, judicial and scholarly
discussions contribute little to the working definition of "maker."
As for "user," the product-dynamism approach offers a definition
that is a subset of the one prevailing in conventional understand-
ings of products liability. I elaborate below on these preliminary
thoughts.
1. "Product." Commentators frequently pose the question of
what is a product,' and some conclude that a coherent defini-
tion cannot be derived: Neither caselaw nor products liability scho-
larship delineates a clear boundary around the term 5  None-
theless, the definitional enterprise has been ongoing for a long
time in several areas. American law identifies a meaningful diver-
gence between products on the one hand, and services or process-
es on the other, in subjects other than products liability. Antitrust
and patent law, for examples, insist on the distinction. 6 Article
253. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
254. See James P. Maloney et al., Note, What Is or Is Not a Product Within the
Meaning of Section 402A, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 625 (1974); Jonathan B. Mintz, Strict Lia-
bility for Commercial Intellect 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 617, 644-49 (1992); John Riper,
Note, Strict Liability in Hybrid Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 391 (1980).
255. See Maloney et al., supra note 254; STAPLETON, supra note 12, at 303-11; see
also MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILrrY 7.03[1], at 7-9 (1987)
(stating that caselaw definitions of product cannot be reconciled).
256. For distinctions made in antitrust law, see the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1994) (making it illegal to form tying arrangements, where both the tying and the tied
goods are tangible items-i.e., goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
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2 of the UCC, which pertains to the sale of goods, has been con-
strued by commentators and judges not to apply where a relevant
item is a service rather than a good . 7 This division, however,
only begins to say what a product is.
Understanding the characteristics of a product calls for an
understanding of its sociological context. As a starting point, sym-
bolic interactionism suggests that a product must be capable of
existence in tangible, material form. Although intangible things
have symbolic effect, the symbolic power of an entity is a function
of the thing's ability to be perceived."8 Visibility and tangibility
make that power evident. Conventional products liability law gen-
erally supports these criteria. Statutory definitions of "product"
either explicitly or implicitly require tangibility, and caselaw is
generally in accord. 9 Two influential definitions of "product,"
those of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act2' and the Eu-
ropean Union products liability statute,21 also require tangibility.
A product need not have been sold, but it must have been, to
quote the thoughtful Ohio statute on products liability, "produced,
manufactured, or supplied for introduction into trade or com-
merce." 2 As is seen in Figure 2, the decision to buy is an inte-
commodities); see also Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins, 664 F.2d 1348, 1352-54 (9th Cir. 1982)
(same). Section 6 of the Clayton Act also excludes from its purview practices that re-
strain the sale or employment of labor as opposed to goods. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994)
(the "labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce"). Patent law
distinguishes between product patents and process patents. See In re Taylor, 360 F.2d
232, 235-36 (C.C.P.A. 1966); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugui Pharmaceutical Co., 706 F. Supp. 94,
107 (D. Mass. 1989); In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289, 1294 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (stating distinc-
tion between medical products and medical processes).
257. See 21st Century Properties Co. v. Carpenter Insulation and Coatings Co., 694 F.
Supp. 148, 151 n.2 (D. Md. 1988) (holding that roofs, due to their immoveable nature,
are not goods); G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1982) (overruled
on other grounds) (holding that the construction of a house is a service).
258. See Holman, supra note 152, at 110-13.
259. Utilities cases are an exception; some courts deem electricity to be a product
once it passes through the customer's meter. The cases are divided. See infra notes 293-
94 and accompanying text.
260. "'Product' means any object possessing intrinsic value, capable of delivery either
as an assembled whole or as a component part, or parts and produced for introduction
into trade or commerce." MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCr LIABILITY AcT § 102(c), reprinted
in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, at 62,717 (1979).
261. "'[P]roduct' means all movables, with the exception of primary agricultural prod-
ucts and game." Council Directive 85/374, art. 2, 1985 OJ. (L 210) 29, 30. The European
Union statute adds an exception to this definition by stating that "product" includes
electricity. Id.
262. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(L)(1)(b) (Anderson 1993).
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gral part of the triangular relationship that describes product dyna-
mism. For purposes of identifying products, a sale need not have
occurred, but the product must be something that is to be offered
for sale. The reason for this requirement is that products liability
is fundamentally a commercial and transactional concept. Only
manufacture in quantity can result in a clear separation between
maker and product. The historical development of products liabil-
ity 3 and the function of a product as communication sup-
port the requirement of a commercial context.265
The Marxist understandings reflected in postindustrial accident
law elaborate on this description. A product, following Marx, is
manufactured in quantity and contains embedded, alienated la-
bor.' These added elements of the definition can be inferred
from the historical coincidence of industrialization and the birth of
products liability law. It is also consistent with caselaw: Virtually
all products liability actions involve products that fit this descrip-
tion, and cases where the injurious objects are not produced in
quantity cause the courts anguish.267
Symbolic interactionism adds an additional set of require-
ments. A product is an object that is capable of serving as com-
munication, as a shaper of identity, and as an antecedent stimu-
263. See supra text accompanying notes 71-95.
264. When a product is used to communicate, its messages derive from its abstract
traits rather than its uniqueness. See Kilbourne, supra note 106, at 226. A distinctive
appearance or a brand name transcends the individual who has acquired the product.
Holman agrees. In presenting her theory of product use as communication, she uses
numerous examples of products, all of them items mass-marketed in commerce. See
Holman, supra note 152, at 106. (Holman's work affiliation stated in Product Use as
Communication is Young & Rubicam, an advertising agency.) Although Holman notes the
theoretical appeal of her ideas to "communication scholars," id. at 114, she puts emphasis
on what she labels "consumer behavior, segmentation, and advertising." Id. at 115. A
commercial context appears essential to support product use as communication.
265. Accord, Stapinski v. Walsh Constr. Co., 383 N.E.2d 473, 475-76 (Ind. App. 1978)
(holding that under Indiana law negligence standard, not strict liability, applies to non-
commercial transactions), vacated, 395 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. 1979).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 96-104.
267. See, e.g., Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 756, 764
(Ct. App. 1989) (discussing apartment complex, including playground equipment and
grounds); Moore v. Jesco, Inc. 531 So. 2d 815, 816-17 (Miss. 1988) (discussing steel poul-
try houses); Papp v. Rocky Mountain Oil & Minerals, Inc., 769 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Mont.
1989) (discussing an oil treatment facility); Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 301 A.2d
463, 466-67 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (stating that "a landlord is not engaged in mass
production"), aff'd, 311 A.2d 1 (NJ. 1973).
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lus.m For the resulting lawsuit to fit within the category of true
products liability law as propounded here, the product must have
exercised these dynamic powers. This requirement eliminates sever-
al paradigms. For example, products liability is an inappropriate
label where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant hit her with a
lawnmower: There the lawnmower would be an "inert object 269
rather than an agent. A swimming pool into which a drunk person
falls and drowns is also ineligible. Conventional nomenclature
excludes these situations by stating that the product is not defec-
tive but, as has been pointed out repeatedly, the word "defective"
is simply a conclusion, bereft of any independent meaning."
Consciously trying to determine whether a product is dynamic
would make for a difficult exercise, and courts do not undertake
this exercise consciously; but this criterion helps to show why
certain cases involving products fit so poorly into products liability
law.
The requirement that the product be capable of serving as
communication, a shaper of identity, and an antecedent stimulus is
illustrated by the doctrinal distinction between prescription and
nonprescription drugs. Led by a much-noted California prece-
dent"' and comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement,'m
many state courts exempt prescription drugs from strict liabili-
ty. 73 Prescription drugs are sometimes said to be too valuable to
268. See supra Part I, section C.
269. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
270. See, e.g., STAPLETON, supra note 18, at 233-74 (characterizing defect as a term
with many possible meanings and uses); HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 29, at 492
("What the courts mean" by defective design "is not clear."); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY: CASES AND MATERIALS 189-90 (2d ed. 1989) (argu-
ing that a single test for defectiveness may not work well in all cases); see also Powers,
supra note 9, at 659-65 (arguing that defectiveness is, or should be, a proxy for negli-
gence); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 837-38 (1973) (creating influential risk-utility test for defective design, an indetermi-
nate seven-factor balance that includes attention to insurance and other social-political
concerns); cf Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 474-77
(1987) (contending that risk-utility test for defective design is incoherent, impossible to
administer, and a radical "assault on markets and private ordering").
271. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). According to com-
ment k, products that are valuable yet "unavoidably unsafe" are not subject to strict
products liability. Id.
273. The Supreme Court of Utah has followed the blanket immunity approach of
Brown, and other courts have expressed willingness to protect prescription drugs from
strict liability. See Glassman v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 606 N.E.2d 338, 342-43 (Ill. App. Ct.
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bear the punishment of strict liability. According to the Utah Su-
preme Court, the exemption of prescription drugs may be defend-
ed as consistent with FDA regulation and the public interest in
the availability and affordability of prescription drugs 74 This ra-
tionale fails to explain the refusal of courts to extend the applica-
tion of comment k to nonprescription drugsO75 The product-dy-
namism approach works better: In most cases, consumers do not
choose prescription drugs in the sense that they choose nonpre-
scription drugs. 6 Over-the-counter sales involve advertising and
marketing aimed directly at the user. The products are physically
close to consumers, in supermarket aisles, at eye level. Simulta-
neously, they communicate both a vision of happiness and a por-
trait of the consumer as weak or insufficiently stoic. Messages such
as these are conveyed by prescription drugs in a lesser way. Thus
prescription drugs are not true products to consumers in most situ-
ations, whereas nonprescription drugs fit the description of prod-
ucts. 2
7
Although the prodhct must be capable of taking tangible
form, "product" encompasses more than one single item made by
a maker and used by a user. For purposes of the doctrinal ques-
tion of generic or product-line liability, many individual objects
1992), appeal denied, 610 N.E.2d 1262 (IlL. 1993); Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206,
219-20 (Pa. 1971); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1991); see also Gra-
ham v. Wyeth Lab., 906 F.2d 1399, 1406 (10th Cir.) (requiring case-by-case application of
comment k), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990); West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608,
613 (Ark. 1991) (holding that the determination of whether a product is unavoidably
unsafe is a question of fact); Pollard v. Ashby, 793 S.W.2d 394, 399-400 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990) (en banc) (holding that comment k is an affirmative defense). But see Shanks v.
Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992) (rejecting formal adoption of comment k in
Alaska). The current draft Restatement follows the trend of limiting liability for harms
caused by prescription drugs. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 8.
274. See Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 95, 97-99.
275. See Brown, 751 P.2d at 477 (stating that comment k applies to prescription
drugs).
276. See DAVID A. FISCHER & WILLIAM POWERS, JR., PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 407 n.1 (2d ed. 1994) (describing the physician's role in choosing pre-
scription drugs).
277. Within the category of prescription drugs (a category that includes medical devic-
es) there exists a range of product dynamism. At opposite ends of the spectrum are
drugs chosen after much thought by the user-for example, minoxidil for hair loss and
nicotine patches for smokers-and drugs administered to an unconscious patient. Products
liability fits the former situation and not the latter. But intermediate situations may com-
bine symbolism and choice utility; in these cases, the appropriate judicial response is to
place weight on the symbolic elements of the product
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merge to become a "product" whose marketing or design can be
challenged by an injured plaintiff. As Figure 2 indicates, the prod-
uct as agent also can encompass an entire product line, as in, for
example, the agency of product upon maker, where the existence
of this entity shapes job descriptions and involving lines. Tangibili-
ty in part defines a product, but the agency or dynamic force of a
product extends far beyond its embodiment in one manufactured
entity.s
2. "User." The user is a person who has chosen to have a
relationship with the maker and the product. My reference to
choice-a tremendously complex topic in its own right-is intended
here minimally, to require only the possibility of nonuse. A user is
someone who is able to do without the product, or to substitute
another product, while remaining able to fulfill her purposes.
The relationship between user and maker, evoked approxi-
mately in the term "privity," is fundamental to true products liabil-
ity. Without question, privity is archaic. When torts concepts re-
placed contract requirements following the rise of mass marketing,
privity fell into analytical disrepute. 79 But the tradition continues
to express meaning. User and maker are united not by contract
but by communication. In the act of use-a choice-the user ex-
presses acceptance of a message from the maker. Purchase is the
clearest way a user can communicate approval to the maker; thus,
the paradigmatic user is a customer who actually bought the prod-
uct. It is possible, however, for the user to communicate accep-
tance to the maker in another status-as borrower, caregiver, gift
recipient, even thief-although purchase is the strongest expression
of this communication.
As Figure 2 indicates, the relationship between user and prod-
uct involves role definition, enticement, communication of status
messages, and development of personhood. The potential of a pro-
duct is actualized in use; the user receives messages and then
278. Thus far I have avoided this locution, because it seems to me somewhat
conclusory, but a "product" is often roughly equivalent to what is commonly known as a
consumer product. There are exceptions: as I go on to argue, true products liability can
extend to workplace injury or injury to military service personnel because product dyna-
mism may be strongly present in these situations. See infra text accompanying notes
327-44. In general, however, the elements of user choice and mass-marketed distribution
mean that most true products liability cases will involve products marketed to consumers.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 73-82.
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decides to acquire the product in order to deploy her own messag-
es to others. To revisit the pharmaceuticals example, patients who
choose to consume nonprescription drugs receive and communicate
messages more personal to themselves-more central to their per-
sonhood-than is the case with consumers of prescription drugs.
Just as a nonprescription drug is more of a "product," so is its
consumer more of a "user" for the same reasons involving agency
and autonomous communication.
The relationship of products to personhood-identifiable with
Hegel and, in the legal context, Margaret Jane Radin-adds the
requirement that a user be a literal person." ° Although (as I will
elaborate below) "maker" always includes various sources of agen-
cy, the entity that relates to products as communication must be a
person in the philosophical sense-with one self-concept, life plan,
and set of entitlements. Consistent with this requirement, when a
product causes harm, the injury must be in the form of harm to
person or property in order for true products liability to exist."8
3. "Maker." For several reasons, "maker" is the most
complex leg of the triangle. Unlike the user and the product, the
maker is not an entity characterized by integrated agency. Multiple
identities exist behind the label. Products liability doctrine reflects
these multiple identities. In its perception of defendants, American
products liability law includes two distinct, historic themes: A de-
fendant is the entity liable for producing (a tort approach, ground-
ed in the wrong of the manufacturer in exposing persons to risk)
and alternatively it is the entity liable for selling (a contract
approach, traceable to Roman sales law, and assimilated into tort
law by the Restatement's choice of the term "seller" for purposes
of strict liability).' Other doctrines such as misrepresentation
and breach of implied warranty, which partake of both contract
and tort, further layer the problem with competing ideas of what
kind of conduct gives rise to products liability. The category that I
280. In the future, developments in artificial intelligence or changes in the understand-
ing of business corporations may indicate a need to change this requirement. Some soci-
ologists anticipate an expanded vocabulary of personhood or selfhood that would grow to
include such newly envisioned "persons," transcending the limits that I have endorsed in
this Article. On this subject, see ALAN WOLFE, THE HUMAN DIFFERENCE: ANIMALS,
CoM'trERs, AND THE NECEssrrY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1993).
281. See infra notes 323-26 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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have labeled "maker" has borne much of the brunt of products li-
ability confusion, as writers and courts roil the question of who is
strictly liable for harms caused by a product. Often viewing the
problem pragmatically as one of locating a suitable defendant,
commentators burden "maker" with more than a one-third share
of attention in the triangle of true products liability.
The crux of "maker" is intentionality, which is not always a
straightforward concept. Intentionality extends beyond selling and
producing. The maker of a product is the entity that envisioned it
as an item of commerce to be conveyed to a user via persuasion.
But that entity is not completely integrated. The maker includes
several human beings and combines several human functions: de-
sign, the repetitive work of executing that design, marketing, pro-
motion, strategic decisions about the nature of the sale, and re-
ceipt of payment in exchange for the product. A maker is a de-
ployer. In a collective expression-here the fiction of the corpo-
ration as person is apt-the maker decides to market a product
and also engages in relationships with that product and with the
user.
The ways in which a product and user relate to a maker as
described above may be re-seen from the maker's perspective.
Product and user are both sources of decision about product sup-
ply. As Marx pointed out, the existence of the product decides the
nature of work. Products shape job descriptions and human lives.
The user, in the form of a collective demand function and also in
explicit verbal communication, informs the maker whether and
how to provide products in the market. 3
The maker, like products liability itself, can exist only in some
kind of market economy in which consumer demand is at least a
large part of the force that drives production and individuals can
choose to buy the maker's product, buy a substitute, or refrain
altogether from purchase. The connection between products liabili-
ty and free-market capitalism, still somewhat unexplored in aca-
demic writing,' is exceedingly strong: Development of products
283. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES
TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (arguing that complaints
(voice) and withdrawing (exit) are equally important communicative measures that con-
sumers, clients, and citizens use to reach providers and authorities).
284. For explorations of the connection, see STAPLETON, note 12, at 185-88 (suggest-
ing that "the profit motive" is a more coherent conceptual boundary than "product" to
achieve related aims); cf Abel, supra note 14, at 443 (arguing that liability law "repro-
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liability law in the nations of the world usually correlates with the
size and productivity of their business sectors. Products do not
exist outside of commerce. Just as one of the defining elements of
a product is a commercial context,' the maker is defined in
part as an entity that charges, and receives payment, for the deliv-
ery of its product.
B. Nominal Products Liability Contrasted
Only a minority of cases commonly regarded as products lia-
bility actions fall within the descriptive boundaries of true products
liability. "Nominal products liability" imposes few criteria-the
products liability label is applied ipse dixit, with little heed paid to
the cost of confusion and misunderstanding that results. The cate-
gories of product, maker, and user are narrower than current pro-
ducts liability doctrine would suggest. Nominal rather than true
products liability exists when instruments of harm are not prod-
ucts, plaintiffs are not users, or defendants are not makers.
1. Instruments of Harm That Are Not Products. The defini-
tional elements of "product" summarized in the prior section
suggest the existence of objects that do not fit within these
criteria. Caselaw classified under the products liability label
includes several instruments of harm that do not fit within the
boundaries of a product. Among the more important of these
problems are substances delivered without regard to the choice of
consumers, used products, and products that are sold or delivered
in conjunction with a service.
a. Substances that are delivered without regard to
choice. Notable examples in this category include transfused blood,
electricity or gas, and mass-distributed vaccines. Blood is not a
product in the sense of product dynamism because it is not signifi-
cantly changed by embedded labor. 6 It cannot stimulate new
duces bourgeois ideology by commodifying experience and justifying inequality") (citing
Abel, A Critique of American Tort Law, 8 BRrr. J.L. & SoC'Y 199 (1981)); Priest, Cur-
rent Insurance Crisis, supra note 14, at 1585-86 (arguing that loss spreading in products
liability cases is unfair to the poor); Stayin, supra note 214, at 193-207 (discussing inter-
national-trade implications of product liability rules).
285. See supra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
286. I stress "significantly." Transfused blood is changed to some degree by human
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needs because it is distributed as a necessary replacement for
something that its consumers already have or recently had. As
Professor Ausness has pointed out, the distinction does not lie in
the "naturalness" of blood; substances that occur naturally,8
and even living organisms 9 can be regarded as products in the
law. Caselaw is in accord,290 although the courts usually rely on a
statute291 or a misplaced policy rationale. 2
Electricity or gas, as provided by utilities to buildings, is not a
product for similar reasons. Electricity and gas do not stimulate
needs: they can be provided before any customer arrives. They are
intangible and unseen; one court invokes their ineffable quality by
describing electricity as "a subtle agency that pervades all space
and evades successful definition."293 Caselaw tends to support
this interpretation, and dicta about whether electricity arrives to
consumers in "a marketable state"'294 come close to expressing
the appropriate distinction. "Marketable" is a word that may beg
the question of what is a product. But courts that use it probably
allude to the antecedent-stimulus test for a product.
Vaccines distributed pursuant to mass immunization programs
are not products because of the absence of a choice to encounter
them. This generalization will probably endure despite increased
insistence by parents that they have a right to refuse mass-distrib-
labor. But after human beings have completed their work with it, blood retains most of
the characteristics that had existed before this effort.
287. Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict Products Liability:
What Liability Rule Should Be Applied to the Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 KY.
LJ. 705, 712-15 (1990).
288. See Sease v. Taylor's Pets, Inc., 700 P.2d 1054 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
a pet skunk was a product), appeal denied, 299 Or. 584 (1985).
289. Cf Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (approving patentability of
genetically-engineered bacteria).
290. For cases that reject strict liability for harms caused by contaminated blood, see,
e.g., Wilson v. American Red Cross, 600 So. 2d 216, 217-18 (Ala. 1992) (approving sum-
mary judgment for defendant); Zichichi v. Middlesex Mem. Hosp., 528 A.2d 805, 807-08
(Conn. 1987) (holding that plaintiff is limited to negligence theory). Similarly, one case
involving transmission by blood of the virus associated with AIDS approves contract or
negligence actions, but rejects strict products liability. Rogers v. Miles Lab., Inc., 802 P.2d
1346 (Wash. 1991).
291. See 2 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 9 4040.10, 90,112-95,260 (1993) (listing blood
shield statutes, which have been enacted by 48 states).
292. See, e.g., Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 312 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)
(reasoning that if the sale of blood were subjected to strict liability, patients would suf-
fer), aff'd, 125 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991).
293. Farina v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 438 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647 (App. Div. 1981).
294. Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 343 N.E.2d 465, 470 (Iil. 1976).
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uted vaccines on behalf of their children.9 Even allowing for
the possibility of refusal, mass immunizations eliminate the essen-
tial decisionmaking function of the individual user. Support for this
proposition is extensive and varied. Courts universally recognize an
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine for injuries caused
by mass inoculation: This rule presumes that when a patient is
vaccinated in a mass immunization, she lacks the individual atten-
tion of a physician.296 Vaccines are also one of the few consumer
goods whose propensity to injure is addressed by preemptive fed-
eral legislation that substitutes a compensation scheme for full tort
recovery 97
As it happens, the problem of vaccine-related injury is an in-
stance of agreement between economics-based reasoning and the
theory of product dynamism.298 The two approaches are not co-
terminous or equivalent, but economic analysis helps to answer the
fundamental question of whether product dynamism is present in
the context of mass immunization. This economic analysis has been
undertaken in the literature. Using elementary price theory, some
writers have said that vaccines should be treated differently from
other pharmaceutical products because of their price inelastici-
ty2 99 Because manufacturers cannot spread the costs or risks of
injury by passing them along to buyers, it has been argued that
vaccines are unique for purposes of liability. Price inelasticity is
indeed a helpful concept, but only as the means to an end-that
is, toward identifying product dynamism. When users and makers
295. See Kathleen Kelleher, Take Two Herbs and Call Me in the Morning, L.A.
TIMES, May 15, 1994, at J12 (describing trend among some parents to refuse vaccination
of their children).
296. See Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1344 (5th Cir. 1977).
297. See Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 387,
387 (1987) (discussing National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 300)). This legislation
emphasizes the unique status of vaccines; although it was statedly aimed at preserving
supply, the statute also serves to isolate this entity from products in general.
298. For other examples, see supra notes 16 and 38 and accompanying text.
299. Fay F. Spence, Note, Alternatives to Manufacturer Liability For Injuries Caused
by the Sabin-Type Oral Polio Vaccines, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 711, 736 n.186 (1987);
see also Priest, Current Insurance Crisis, supra note 14, at 1569 (discussing alternative in-
surance mechanisms for the vaccine market); cf. H. William Smith, Note, Vaccinating
AIDS Vaccine Manufacturers Against Product Liability, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 207,
236-39 (1992) (describing economic structure of vaccine marketplace).
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cannot communicate with each other via price, then true products
liability is absent. When price communication moves in elastic
fashion between maker and user, true products liability is likely to
be present.
b. Used products. Is there a meaningful difference be-
tween used and new products? Of the courts that have considered
this question, most generally insist on a distinction."0
Commentators tend to agree.3 ' Courts also enforce disclaimers
made in the sale of used products,3" and some have gone so far
as to hold that no implied warranty attaches to the sale of used
goods.' 3 But disclaimers are generally deemed unconscionable in
the sale of new products, especially attempts to disclaim responsi-
bility for personal injury." As with many problems of products
liability, courts and commentators reach the right answer-a pro-
duct is indeed transformed by use-but they are hard pressed to
state their reasoning. Proffered explanations generally beg the
questions they raise.0 5
300. The leading case is TiUman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299 (Or. 1979);
accord Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 791 P.2d 1303 (Idaho 1990); Grimes v. Axtell
Ford Lincoln-Mercury, 403 N.W.2d 781 (Iowa 1987). But see Stiles v. Batavia Atomic
Horseshoes, Inc., 579 N.Y.S.2d 790, 792-93 (App. Div. 1992) (imposing strict liability on
reseller), rev'd on other grounds, 597 N.Y.S.2d 666 (N.Y. 1993).
301. See infra note 305. For mild dissent, see David G. Owen, Rethinking The Policies
of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681, 698 (1980).
302. Although this doctrinal point is clear, there are few reported cases. One is
Lecates v. Hertrich Pontiac Buick Co., 515 A.2d 163 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
303. See Valley Datsun v. Martinez, 578 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979); Bayer
v. Winton Motor Car Co., 160 N.W. 642, 644-45 (Mich. 1916). Current doctrine has
moved away from this harsh extreme, however.
304. See U.C.C. §§ 2-302, 2-316, 2-719 (1994) (providing contracts-based rules pertain-
ing to disclaimers of warranties). For cases refusing to enforce disclaimers, see Matthews
v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1973); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC
Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 120-26 (Ct. App. 1982).
305. Professor Martin, for example, writes that "the risk-spreading policies that support
strict liability simply are not as compelling with respect to the sellers of used products."
Martin, supra note 2, at 1073. "Risk-spreading policies" are not especially compelling to
many observers, e.g., Powers, supra note 9, at 645-46; Priest, Current Insurance Crisis, su-
pra note 14, at 1553-82; and if they are compelling, they ought to be celebrated, not re-
treated from, wherever risks and unequal abilities to withstand these risks coexist. If all
Martin means is that new-product sellers tend to be the Goodyears and Westinghouses of
the world, whereas used-product sellers tend to be poor and obscure, the logical doctrinal
response is to condition loss spreading on the degree of wealth of the defendant rather
than rely on an inexact proxy. Cf Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?,
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 427-28 (1992) (arguing that courts should consider the extent of
a defendant's wealth in establshing compensatory damages). Professors Henderson and
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Used products differ from new products mainly in the mes-
sage that accompanies purchase and sale. The phenomenon of
symbolic contamination that explains, among other things, why
there is no market for the sale of certain goods," distinguishes
used things from new things. Communication from maker to user
and from product to user is disrupted by the messages added, like
static, by other sources. This communication may be clarified when
a seller overhauls the used product significantly and offers the re-
built item to a new user; and in this situation, the seller appro-
priately becomes a maker and is liable under true products liability
doctrine.3" Unless a maker's agency clearly intervenes, however,
the used product is layered with too many messages to fit within
the true-products-liability triangle.
c. Sales-service hybrids. The sales-service problem arises
when "a product is. . . delivered to (and used or consumed by)
the buyer in the course of the seller's rendering a service. In the
usual cases, the product permanently leaves the seller's possession,
or is used up in the course of the transaction."3"8 The question
then becomes whether to apply "strict liability" or negligence.
Courts and commentators have suggested several approaches to
this topic. One approach asks whether the seller is in the business
of selling the product; if so, then "strict products liability" applies
to the harmful occurrence. 9 Another, more analytical, approach
asks whether the "essence of the transaction" is the sale of a
product or the rendering of a service.310 A modification of "es-
Twerski write that one of the reasons courts have used for exempting resellers from
strict liability is "that many, if not most, used product sales are 'as is' transactions."
HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 18, at 152 (citation omitted). This rather circular
assertion appears in the Henderson & Twerski casebook one page after an excerpt from
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Co., 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960), in which Chrysler
thought it had consummated an "as is" transaction, but was informed otherwise in this
landmark opinion.
306. See supra text accompanying note 157.
307. See Crandall v. Larkin and Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31, 33-34 (S.D.
1983).
308. HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 18, at 158.
309. The leading case is Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 258 A.2d 697, 701-03 (NJ. 1969).
Cf. Carroll v. Grabavoy, 396 N.E.2d 836, 838-39 (Ill. App. 1979) (holding that dentist is
not in the business of selling dentures and thus not strictly liable under an express war-
ranty theory).
310. See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 18, at 158; see also IT Corp. v. LTX
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sence of the transaction" looks for the essence of the injury."'
Yet another approach asks whether this situation is one that
warrants facilitating the burden of proof for plaintiffs: when
plaintiffs face a problem of proof, courts should impose strict
liability.31
2
Whereas the used-products commentary is unpersuasive be-
cause it tends to resort to circular reasoning or unsupported asser-
tion, the sales-service commentary is quite thoughtful. Writers tend
to criticize one another. Dana Shelhimer attacks the essence-of-
the-transaction approach, especially as modified by John Riper,
and implies that the burden-of-proof concern pervading the work
of Professor Powers is of only academic interest.3  Her own
idea-balancing in each case the justifications for strict liability
against the social need for affordable access to the product or
service-is nicely refuted by Powers' disdain for grand policy-
making in products liability.3 4 Focusing on the occupational
identity of the seller, the first approach mentioned, once led for-
mer Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird to write that the distinction
between professionals and nonprofessionals was arbitrary and "elit-
ist., 31
5
Enter product dynamism. Attention to the product itself yields
an answer to the taxonomical problem. Some kind of essence-of-
the-transaction inquiry is warranted: Did the plaintiff experience
the sale-service transaction because she sought a product or be-
cause she sought a service? 31 6 If she was lured by the product,
then it ought not to matter whether the source of the inquiry was
negligence or the product itself because of the defendant's connec-
tion to the product. Thus, the essence-of-the-transaction approach
Corp., 926 F.2d 1258, 1266-67 (1st Cir. 1991) (illustrating concept with respect to hybrid
transactions); G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1982) (overruled on
other grounds) (same).
311. See Riper, supra note 254, at 404-07.
312. See Powers, supra note 244, at 425-27.
313. Dana Shelhimer, Comment, Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions and the Strict Lia-
bility Dilemma, 43 Sw. LJ. 785, 810-12 (1989).
314. See Powers, supra note 9, at 639-40; cf. William C. Powers, Jr., The Persistence
of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REv. 777, 815 (1983) (arguing that distinguish-
ing fault from strict liability wastes "time and energy").
315. Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247, 258 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
316. She might have experienced the transaction without any expression of her own
agency, in which case the situation would fall well outside the boundaries of true prod-
ucts liability.
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generally ought to be followed in determining whether a sales-
service hybrid transaction involves a product.317
An illustration of how product dynamism elucidates essence
of-the-transaction reasoning is the opinion by Justice Grodin in
Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,318 a DES case in which the
plaintiff sought to hold the dispensing pharmacist strictly liable.
The California Supreme Court was divided 4-3 on this question,
and five separate opinions were issued; only Grodin's opinion was
devoted entirely to the work-tasks of the pharmacist and his role
in the delivery of prescription drugs. To Grodin, the essence of
this transaction was neither a service nor a sale. The pharmacist is
not a retailer because he "is not free to sell a prescription drug to
anyone who merely requests the product... unlike a car dealer
or a tire vendor ....,,319 Nor is he a service provider because
pharmacists' professional services, such as giving advice, usually are
delivered in "incidental" fashion if at all.32 The Grodin concur-
rence is bracketed by opinions that miss the point: At one end, a
two-person majority opinion, ruling against the plaintiff, distract-
317. According to Shelhimer, the essence-of-the-transaction test is flawed because it
does not say whether this essence is to be determined objectively or subjectively.
Shelhimer, supra note 313, at 810. As an example, Shelhimer mentions a patient who
goes to a hospital expressly to take a drug for a week; according to the physician's or-
ders, this patient must spend this entire week in the hospital. When the drug proves
injurious, does "strict liability" apply to the hospital? Shelhimer believes that the "objec-
tive" essence of this transaction is a service, whereas the patient "subjectively" entered
the hospital to buy a product. Id. at 810-11. What to do? The answer is simpler than
she thinks: The essence of this event may or may not be a sale, but it is clearly not a
service. Shelhimer's attempt to justify the "objective" answer is that "those who are sick
go to hospitals so that the doctors' and hospitals' professional services will cure them."
Shelhimer, supra note 313, at 810. As presented, however, Shelhimer's problem of this
patient clearly involves a transaction to obtain a drug.
Subjective-versus-objective dilemmas are a recurring theme in accident law, and the
tension between the two approaches has never been completely resolved. This tension is
not a compelling argument against essence-of-the-transaction any more than it raises fatal
doubts about reasonableness, negligence, comparative fault, assumption of risk, and other
imperfect yet meaningful concepts that help fact-finders to judge the conduct of others.
See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 65, at 453-56 (5th ed. 1984) (addressing this issue in the context of contributory negli-
gence). In general, the inquiries suggested by the theory of product dynamism can be
understood as "objective," to the extent that word retains meaning, in that courts would
try to refer to the generally-understood dynamic properties of the product.
318. 710 P.2d 247, 256-57 (Cal. 1985) (Grodin, J., concurring).
319. Id. at 256.
320. Id.
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edly praises the unique knowledge of pharmacists; 321 at the other
end, Chief Justice Bird complains about elitism and the betrayal of
Traynor's "policies." 322 Grodin reaches the heart of the relevant
transaction. In the area of sales-service hybrids, among many oth-
ers, the theory of product dynamism insists on focus-this maker,
this product, this user-and steers observers away from the distor-
tion of distributive concerns.
2. Plaintiffs Who Are Not Users
a. Business entities and economic-loss claimants. Because
the triangular relationship of product, user, and maker involves a
manipulation or change of the user's personhood, the user must be
a literal person. Current understandings of what it means to be a
person require literal humanness.3' Business entities are fre-
quently inspired by products, but they are not users in the sense
of true products liability.
This reality is acknowledged in caselaw by the courts' discom-
fort with economic loss attributable to product malfunction in com-
mercial settings. Purchasers usually have no remedy for these
damages in either strict liability or negligence, except for the cases
in which physical property is damaged. This rule is conventionally
attributed to the existence of the UCC, which "provides a struc-
tured basis for allocating risks of loss."324 The availability of a
much-admired code certainly makes the economic loss problem
easier to resolve; it eliminates the need for recourse to a theory
such as product dynamism. But invoking the UCC seems some-
what opportunistic, because courts and writers happily ignore or
override it whenever they prefer a tort-based rationale.3z5
321. Id& at 251 (opinion of the court).
322. Id. at 258, 260-61 (Bird, C.i., dissenting).
323. See supra notes 83-92.
324. William K. Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The Ascendancy of
Contract over Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 731, 758 (1990). As Professor Schwartz ampli-
fies, contract rules derived from the UCC are generally preferable in products liability
cases because of the principle of legislative superiority: The UCC is a statute, entitled to
deference. Gary T. Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of
J'Aire and of Products Liability, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 37, 70 (1986).
325. See FISCHER & POWERS, supra note 276, at 562 ("The [U.C.C.] imposes many
restrictions on recovery that are circumvented by the strict liability doctrine."); Reed
Dickerson, The ABCs of Products Liability-With a Close Look at Section 402A and the
Code, 36 TENN. L. REV. 439, 452-53 (1969) (condemning the ascendancy of § 402A over
the UCC in cases where both tort and contract reasoning could be applied). Justice
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As an explanation of the limited availability of economic-loss
damages in products liability actions, the theory of product dyna-
mism is more coherent than intermittent attention to the UCC.
Injury that hurts an individual in her property or in her person is
critically different from financial loss. Although money is a real
object in the universe of symbolic interactionism, injury to person
or property is several steps closer to the user's self. This point is
generally lost in the economics-driven analyses that dominate prod-
ucts liability scholarship, where it is presumed that conduct, prod-
ucts, and injuries are all commensurable within a money-matrix.
By contrast, product dynamism emphasizes tangibility, which is
essential to personal injury and property damages as well as absent
or remote in economic loss.3'
b. Bystanders. As used here, the category of bystander
describes a person who was injured by a product but did not buy
it.3 7 The place of bystanders in products liability has long
occupied the attention of commentators3z8 and lawmakers.
32 9
Foreseeability, but not communication, may unite the bystander
with the maker of a product that inflicts injury. But com-
munication-the connection of energy that ties together product,
Traynor was an early perpetrator. "The remedies of injured consumers ought not to be
made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales." Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962) (citations omitted).
326. Cf. Harvey S. Perlman, Interference With Contract and Other Economic Expec-
tancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 71-72 (1982)
(arguing that "laws of physics" distinguish personal injury and damage to property from
economic loss).
327. Sometimes the word bystander is misused to describe situations when the plaintiff
bought the product and suffered emotionally while a third person suffered physically. In
Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982), a mother suffered
anguish when she realized she had spooned a foreign substance into the month of her
infant son. According to the theory of product dynamism, Mrs. Culbert is no bystander.
She is united by both symbolic communication and money to the maker and the product;
thus, she is a user. The baby is not a user.
328. E.g. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 472-75; STAPLETON, supra note 12, at 127-29.
329. The UCC offers state legislatures three alternative approaches to the bystander
problem. The first is the narrowest: Express and implied warranties run only to the buy-
er, the buyer's family, and house guests. The second extends warranties to all human
beings who may "be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods" and who
suffer personal injury. The third is the same as the second except that it extends warran-
ties to "any person," not just human beings, and is not restricted to personal injury.
U.C.C. § 2-318 (1994).
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user, and maker-is essential for true products liability, thus
placing bystander cases outside the triangle.
The UCC views bystander status as a matter of degree, identi-
fying a middle ground between bystander and buyer.33 This per-
spective is useful in separating true from nominal products liability.
According to the UCC, members of the buyer's immediate family
are more entitled than strangers to share in any warranties at-
tached to the product.3  If the plaintiff-who could be a relative
of the buyer, although true products liability would not require a
formal family relationship-partook of the product's shared com-
munication with the product and with the maker, then this person,
though not a purchaser, becomes less of a bystander and more of
a user. The passenger in a family car is one example of such a
person 3  Similarly, gift recipients and patients can share to a
degree in the user-status that is also occupied by the buyer.
The classic bystander problem involves a plaintiff who is
struck by an automobile that was manufactured by the defendant.
A paradigm case is Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,333 in
which the California Supreme Court correctly pointed out that the
plaintiff was not "a user.''3' Nevertheless, this person was enti-
tled to the protection of products liability law. Perhaps, wrote the
Court, she should have even more protection than a user should
have, because users "have the opportunity to inspect for defects"
and can decide to patronize only "reputable retailers. ' 35 The
better way to write this dictum is in negligence terms: If indeed
the buyer can protect herself through diligent shopping, then the
duty of a reasonable maker to unidentified persons such as by-
standers could be greater. In its trivializing discount of the effect
of symbolic communication toward the buyer, the Elmore opinion
330. No matter which of the three alternatives is chosen, see Ud, the UCC extends
warranties beyond privity into at least the household of the buyer. Each subsequent
alternative is a larger concentric circle around the previous alternative, with the third and
biggest circle approximately equivalent in reach to a tort standard. This scheme presents
bystander status accurately as a question of gradations rather than an either-or dichoto-
my, an approach consistent with the degrees of dynamism present in every product.
331. Id.
332. This paradigm is found in the leading implied-warranty disclaimer case. See
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960) (involving injury to
buyer's wife).
333. 451 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1969).
334. Id. at 89.
335. Id.
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also muddies products liability doctrine. Awareness of products
dynamism would have made both the holding and dictum clearer.
Another type of bystander injury is harm to workers. Often
workplace injury involves nominal rather than true products liabili-
ty. The requirement of communication between maker, user, and
product will frequently exclude jobsite injuries where the worker
does not choose to encounter a particular product, but rather does
what she is assigned. As a general rule, then, employees are ex-
cluded from true products liability because the injury entity is not
a consumer product.
The rule about employees is not rigid, however, because
workers are sometimes lured by a product to take a particular job.
Workers may also be induced to disregard or even imperil their
own safety.336 Again, true products liability can be separated
from nominal products liability by attention to the degree of sym-
bolic content present in the triangular relationship. The same anal-
ysis would be suitable for injuries experienced by military person-
nel while at work.337
A quasi-bystander category is "toxic torts" or "mass torts," in
which a harmful product injures many people. In some of these
cases, notably the Dalkon Shield disaster,' 38 product dynamism is
336. Older workers' compensation cases exhibit this phenomenon. See, e.g., Costeczko
v. Industrial Comm., 60 N.W.2d 355 (Wis. 1953) (denying payment to employee fatally
injured on an amusement park ride run by a co-worker); Redino v. Continental Can Co.,
123 N.E. 886 (N.Y. 1919) (involving a child employee, employed to dip cans, who be-
came fascinated by a stamping machine and injured himself); cf. Stan Gray, Sharing the
Shop Floor, in BEYOND PATRIARCHY: ESSAYS BY MEN ON PLEASURE, POWER, AND
CHANGE 216, 219-20 (Michael Kaufman ed., 1987) (discussing effect of masculine gender
role on decisions to take workplace risks).
337. Although important and famous products liability cases have involved military-
personnel plaintiffs, see Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1985); PETER
H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986), a separate understanding of the status of
military plaintiffs in products liability has not developed. Judges and commentators might
profitably consider the role of product dynamism in the creation of military combat as-
signments. David Boyle, for instance, was a pilot in the Marines; his father claimed that
Boyle was killed because the escape hatch of his CH-53D helicopter opened out instead
of in, and therefore could not function under water. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502-03. What
induces young men to become military pilots: choice, excitement, orders? Boyle's death
preceded the Hollywood paean to Navy flying, Top Gun, but may have been related to
similar antecedents. And what pushed or pulled servicemen into the jungle to spray diox-
in herbicide? In arguing that these inducements or pressures are relevant to the study of
products liability, I suggest that they should be noted in judicial opinions and commen-
tary.
338. See MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST. CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE
DALKON SHIELD (1985).
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strongly present. Other toxic-torts situations involve plaintiffs who
exercised little or no choice to encounter the item or substance;
for example, few persons seek asbestos or other ambient tox-
ins. 39 Prescription drugs and medical devices raise a slightly
harder question because a degree of consumer choice is present
even when the patient does not understand what the product is;
extremely passive recipients fall within the "nominal" rather than
the "true" category, but again the question is one of degree."
In general, the theory of product dynamism has little to do with
the labels of toxic torts or mass torts. These labels allude primarily
to the number of plaintiffs. Quantity of harm, or the number of
people suing, is by contrast not germane to product dynamism,
which looks instead to communication between users, products,
and makers. According to the taxonomy of product dynamism, the
Dalkon Shield litigation is only a distant relative to examples such
as the asbestos cases, whereas the Dalkon Shield cases are closely
related to all true products liability cases.
Children are often the passive recipients of products that
prove injurious in use."41 Their status does not always pose doc-
trinal difficulty. The risk-utility test for design defect and the im-
plied warranty provisions of the UCC make symbolic communica-
tion between the child and the defendant irrelevant. But the con-
sumer expectations test for design defect gives the courts pause in
these cases.' Courts and observers feel compelled to choose be-
tween a pure tort approach, such as the one advocated by Profes-
sor Powers, which repudiates some important aspects of products
liability; 3 or a contract-influenced consumer expectations ap-
proach, which does not say whose expectations govern.3 The
339. An exception, of course, is the removal worker who encounters asbestos or other
toxins because the job is relatively remunerative. Product dynamism would be attenuated
in that situation and would not tend to undermine the validity of a written waiver or
other contractual recharacterization of an encounter with a toxin.
340. See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
341. See Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarket, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982) (involving
child who was fed baby food that contained a foreign substance); Bellotte v. Zayer
Corp., 352 A.2d 723 (N.H. 1976) (involving child injured by flammable pajama fabric);
Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp., 229 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Ct. App. 1986) (involving glass
baby bottle).
342. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 270, at 194. Though dispatched in the current
draft of the ALI's Products Liability Restatement, the consumer expectations test retains
a hold on many state courts. See Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles' Heel, 64 TENN. L. REv. 1265,
1268 (1995).
343. See supra note 9.
344. See April A. Caso, Note, Unreasonably Dangerous Products From a Child's Per-
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theory of product dynamism, sensitive to the difference between
glamorous toys and pajama fabric, offers a more coherent alter-
native for bifurcated-plaintiff problems such as those involving
injured children.
3. Defendants Who Are Not Makers. Recall that the "maker"
of the product is always more than one individual. The term
encompasses several sources of agency. The maker is a deploy-
er-a decisionmaker-that brings together labor and raw materials
to fashion a product for sale. The maker is the entity that de-
serves to be charged with understanding the product as a whole,
and that benefits financially from the commonly understood
properties of the product.
This financial nexus is an important source of products liabili-
ty doctrine, and it is traceable to the sources that explain product
dynamism. Caselaw and the Restatement exempt one-time or ama-
teur sellers from the products liability designation 4 for reasons
consistent with (if not compelled by) the Marxist heritage of prod-
ucts liability law. Industrialization has created sectors and roles for
individuals to play. It would be anachronistic to describe a person
who lived in the eighteenth century as a manufacturer or a con-
sumer.' These labels have clear content today. Products liabili-
ty-both "true" and "nominal"-is therefore confined to those per-
sons who routinely either deploy or benefit from the symbolic
properties of a manufactured item. 7
spective: A Proposal for a Reasonable Child Consumer Expectation Test, 20 RUTGERS L.J.
433, 444 (1989) (describing doctrinal confusion).
345. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Galindo v. Precision Am.
Corp., 754 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that defendant would not be held strictly
liable if jury determined the sale was an isolated event); Santiago v. E.W. Bliss Div., 492
A.2d 1089 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (holding that defendant had executed only a
"casual sale").
346. See generally T.J. Jackson Lears, From Salvation to Self-realization: Advertising
and the Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture 1880-1930, in THE CULTURE OF
CONSUMPTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1880-1980, at 1, 3-4 (Richard
W. Fox & T.J. Jackson Lears eds., 1983) (arguing that category of consumer was invent-
ed in the late nineteenth century).
347. Here I am assuming that the role of maker is somewhat static. Though consistent
with caselaw, this conclusion conflicts with the economics-based tenet that persons move
freely (if there are no extrinsic barriers or transaction costs) into whatever activity pro-
duces the greatest wealth for themselves. Product dynamism, by contrast, maintains that
people bear roles, which create barriers to both achieving and ending the status of "mak-
er"-and that these barriers are not easily quantified as precise transaction costs.
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In Figure 3, a continuum describes the business activity that
might exist in product manufacture and sale. The continuum runs
from the onset of manufacturing activity (identifying and obtaining
raw materials or components) throughout the life of an enterprise
or enterprises that make or sell the product. For some products, a
later stage exists: The entity that fashioned and marketed the pro-
duct ceases activity, and a successor enterprise continues some of
the functions of its predecessor.
Courts and scholars have often found it difficult to identify
the classes of business defendants that can be charged with prod-
ucts liability. Figure 3 refers to some types of enterprises
whose status in products liability has been questioned: Retailers,
trademark licensors, and corporate successors are some of these
borderline-status defendants. Judicial opinions are divided on this
question of identifying defendants. Although some judges try dili-
gently to say what makes one business entity a suitable products
liability defendant and another unsuitable, conceptual clarity has
not emerged from the caselaw. 49
For these harder cases-harder than the problem of nonbusi-
ness sellers, which courts find easy3 5-- the theory of product dy-
namism suggests a line of inquiry: The thing is to blame; was it this
348. Or, as the question is sometimes posed, "Who is Strictly Liable?" See
HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 18, at 136-73.
349. See supra note 245.
350. See supra notes 94-95, 262-65 and accompanying text.
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maker's thing? Or, rephrased to follow the civil law approach: Is
this defendant a gardien de la structure, a keeper of the internal
dynamism of the product? Although these questions do not pro-
duce unequivocal clarity, they are not idle. The problem of the
maker is presented in Figure 3 as a continuum because the status
of "maker" varies in gradation. "Product" and "user" also are func-
tional categories rather than on-off labels, but because of its multi-
ple sources of agency, "maker" is the least determinate of the
three labels.
Was the thing this person's thing? the observer asks, referring
to the criteria set by the theory of product dynamism. To be a
"maker," the defendant must have engaged in many of the activi-
ties listed in Figures 2 and 3: sending and receiving symbolic mes-
sages, deciding self-consciously to put a product in the stream of
commerce, marketing, receiving revenue from product sales, inte-
grating or fashioning a product from unassembled constituents, and
selling. No one person does everything that a maker does, but
when many of these functions are present, the entity is a maker.
Caselaw is consistent with this approach to identifying respon-
sible defendants. For example, finding retailers "strictly" liable in
design defect cases, as many courts say they have done, is not so
illogical or anomalous as commentators have claimed."' Those
who maintain that retailers should not be subject to products lia-
bility, or that such liability is a pragmatic, unprincipled yet accept-
able device to compensate victims,3 52 make the mistake of draw-
ing a bright line between manufacturer and retailer. One designed,
the other did not. As a method of analysis, this posture is errone-
ous for two reasons. First, it assumes that defendants are unitary
entities. "Maker" helps to erase this misplaced bright line between
manufacturer and retailer. Second, this approach accords tort per-
spectives too much privilege, looking (again) to sources of conduct
rather than reasoning from the existence of a product.
For specific elaboration, consider two extremes'of the Figure 3
continuum, right and left. Corporate successors who do not contin-
ue to make the product occupy a relatively remote point towards
351. See Powers, supra note 244, at 426 n.49 (suggesting that strict liability for retail-
ers is "vestigial").
352. See MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LLABILrrY ACT, supra note 260, at § 105 (pro-
viding that a retailer should be strictly liable in products liability cases only if the manu-
facturer is insolvent).
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the right. These defendants have not partaken in much of the role
of maker.3  The successor's connection to the product is typical-
ly only financial: One corporate entity has paid for another's as-
sets, thereby acquiring a financial link to an earlier practice of
product marketing. 4 This connection includes too small a share
of the functions of the maker. Corporate successors are not, then,
makers within true products liability, and their liability would fall
within the nominal category.'
Caselaw also grapples unsatisfactorily with the left side of the
continuum, involving aspects of the maker's role that occur before
the product is put together. The two recurring types of left-side
problems are the government-contract defense cases that allege
defective design and cases involving component manufacturers.
353. As ought to be evident by now, the theory of products dynamism exempts sham
successors from this generalization. A new corporate veil draped around the maker does
not obscure the multiple human functions present in the manufacture and sale of a prod-
uct.
354. This point is demonstrated indirectly by a leading successor-liability case, Ray v.
Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977), in which the California Supreme Court focused on
the continuity of a product line. If the successor continues to manufacture the same
product, "strict tort liability" would apply. Id. at 11. Some commentators have attacked
this approach, arguing that it is contrary to principles of corporate law and imposes tort
liability on those who have done no wrong. See William J. Hudak, Jr., Comment, Impos-
ing Strict Liability Upon a Successor Corporation for the Defective Products of Its Corpo-
rate Predecessor: Proposed Alternatives to the Product Line Theory of Liability, 23 B.C. L.
REv. 1397, 1421-28 (1982). But the Ray opinion, though tinged with unfortunate political
rhetoric, rests soundly on an distinction between product and conduct. When the
successor's connection to the product is strong, as in the case of a continued product
line, it is a "maker," linked to the errant thing. Only pure negligence reasoning or cor-
porate nominalism, rather than true products liability, excuses the successor from respon-
sibility. One major article on successor liability, Jerry J. Phillips, Product Line Continuity
and Successor Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 906 (1983), is in accord, placing
central emphasis on the continuity of product manufacture, and minimal emphasis on
corporate formalities, which are "unimportant." Id. at 921-23.
355. An illustration of the conventional approach to successors' liability is Timothy J.
Murphy, Comment, A Policy Analysis of a Successor Corporation's Liability for Its
Predecessor's Defective Products When the Successor Has Acquired the Predecessor's Assets
for Cash, 71 MARO. L. REv. 815, 848-49 (1988). The author argues that a successor
should be liable based on its actual or constructive knowledge of liability exposure. Dis-
cussing successor liability in the context of firms that have dissolved, Judge Posner wan-
ders down the same path, stressing the need to ask "whether the corporation's tort lia-
bility was foreseen at the time of dissolution." See POSNER, supra note 16, at 213. I find
this emphasis misplaced. The approach, yet another unstated affirmation of tort reasoning
as the way to decide products liability cases, distractedly looks to one small subfraction
of the maker's many activities rather than all of them taken together and ignores the
product.
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These problems are highly fact-specific and can be resolved only
with reference to the functions allocable to the defendant.
The problem of the government contractor defense indicates
one type of split in the role of maker in which a nondefendant (a
government agency) specifies or approves the design of a product
and the defendant-manufacturer executes these specifications and
receives a profit from the sale. This division may be equal for
purposes of imparting the role of maker to the manufacturing
defendant. Government contractor cases could thus be decided
either way. Caselaw offers two approaches to this problem, both
consistent with product dynamism. The first, favored by a majority
of the Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,5 6
relies on the discretionary function exception to the federal
government's consent to suit. This approach concedes that the
manufacturer is a maker, but for reasons extrinsic to products
liability it absolves the maker from liability. 7 An alternative
analysis, as used in the Eleventh Circuit, bars lawsuits only if (1)
the contractor had not designed the defective product or (2) the
contractor had warned the government of the danger in the design
and nonetheless was authorized by the government to proceed. 8
This second approach gives rise to two product-dynamism explana-
tions. Alternative 1 finds that the contractor is not a maker. Un-
der alternative 2, the contractor is a maker, but responsibility
shifts to the (immune) government for the same policy reasons
favored in Boyle.
Also at the left end of the Figure 3 continuum, defendants
occasionally protest that they are not makers but rather compo-
nent manufacturers, too far removed to be liable for the making
of a defective product. In response, courts look to substance-the
numerous functions of a maker-rather than the form of assembly,
and frequently reject these defense arguments. In so doing, they
properly focus on the conscious, cognitive activities of one who
plans and then makes a product.359 Addressing a related prob-
356. 487 U.S. 500 (1985).
357. See id. at 512-13 (citing discretionary function exception and other policy argu-
ments). Equally consistent for the purposes of this Article, the Boyle dissent challenged
Justice Scalia's policy rationale, contending that the Court's majority had usurped the leg-
islative functions of Congress. See id. at 515-31.
358. See Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (11th Cir. 1985), cerL
denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988).
359. See Pust v. Union Supply Co., 561 P.2d 355, 361 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (refusing
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lem, the landmark case Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.3'6 held
that a defendant could not delegate the final stages of assembly
and inspection: In other words, an entity cannot repudiate the
status of maker once that entity has met the functional criteria of
a maker.
C. Tort, Contract, and True Products Liability in Coexistence
As has been seen, the label "products liability" in its current
use lacks precision. When an object causes harm, the question of
responsibility is frequently labeled one of products liability. For
the convenience of having this facile category, American liability
law has paid the price of conceptual coherence.
Understanding the true nature of products liability doctrine
begins with the separation of true from nominal products liability.
Many problems receive the products liability label, but only a
fraction of them fulfill the criteria for true cases. An injury must
have united product, user, and maker in a communicative relation-
ship. Not every instrument of harm is a "product" as adumbrated
by sociology and political theory; not every plaintiff encountered
the product in the conscious, choice-driven, responsive sense that
makes a person a user; and not every defendant partook in the set
of activities that identify a maker. For a problem to fall within
true products liability, all three of these agents must be present.
The absence of any of them relocates the problem to nominal
products liability. 6'
Nominal products liability cases are covered mainly by the
liability rules of tort and contract. Negligence law addresses prob-
lems of risk that can be attributed to heedless conduct. When the
circumstances of the injury suggest lack of care-the disregard that
is central to negligence-symbolic effect may be attenuated. Al-
to permit "a manufacturer to insulate itself from liability by categorizing the sale of its
products as components simply because they have to be assembled"), affd, 583 P.2d 276
(Colo. 1978).
360. 391 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1964).
361. The inquiry that I have in mind is straightforward and would not call for trial
testimony from experts about symbolic interactionism or the niceties of neo-Marxism.
Rather it involves exploration of common-sense shared understandings and an attempt to
envision the mental state of another person, as has been done for centuries in numerous
areas of the law. As I have argued throughout this Article, product-dynamism reasoning
goes on in the minds of juries and judges when they decide products liability cases. Such
reasoning is not only coherent but familiar.
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though many "true" products liability cases are capable of resolu-
tion using negligence principles, the focus of accident law empha-
sizes inattention rather than communication, and thus true prod-
ucts liability is analytically closer to contract than tort.
Tort principles are useful, however, in both "true" and "nomi-
nal" settings. Regardless of the existence of symbolic relationships,
accident law fits analytically with lapses of warning and design.
These functions of a maker-warning and design-imply the exis-
tence of an ideal course of conduct for human beings. Similarly,
tort principles best cover the problem of defenses based on the
plaintiff's conduct. In "nominal" situations such as those involving
bystanders, tort principles rightly identify a wrongdoer-victim, A-
upon-B approach that seeks to determine whether the defendant
acted unreasonably with respect to foreseeable contingencies.
When foreseeability rather than communication connects the plain-
tiff and the defendant, negligence law is indispensable.
The triangular relationship of product, user, and maker, with
each exerting the force of agency upon the others and receiving
agency from them, suggests a contract in its mutuality and its
exchange of communication,362 but contract law is not cotermi-
nous with true products liability. Despite the wide swath of meta-
phor that extends around this word-the social contract,363 mar-
riage as contract, 364 constitutions as contrac36 a more formal
sense of the term prevails in legal doctrine, which maintains that
contract law must address specific promises that are enforceable by
the law.3" The insistence on enforceability implies attention to
human parties to an agreement rather than recognition of the
force of agency inherent in an inanimate object. True products
liability, then, mirrors contract in its fundamental nature rather
than its formal legal requirements.
Contract doctrine continues to be important in sustaining the
development of both true and nominal products liability law. In
coexistence with tort approaches, contract law serves to emphasize
362. On exchange as a central theme of contract law, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CoNTRAcTS § 1.1, at 4 (1990).
363. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND
DISCOURSEs 163 (G.D.H. Cole trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1973) (1762).
364. See Allen M. Parkman, Reform of the Divorce Provisions of the Marriage Con-
tract, 8 BYU J. PuB. L. 91 (1994).
365. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 471 (1793).
366. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
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the communication running between the three entities. This intel-
lectual and theoretical role for contract suggests that doctrinal
devices such as the implied warranty of merchantability will stay
alive even as privity recedes. Similarly, the UCC will remain a
vital source of law for both true and nominal products liability.
As with tort law, contract principles will have practical effect
in nominal products liability too, especially in cases involving eco-
nomic loss to a corporate plaintiff. Economic loss to a corporation
falls outside true products liability and, frequently, outside negli-
gence law as well. The UCC bystander rules address another im-
portant instance of nominal products liability.367
And whither "strict liability in tort" or "strict products liabili-
ty"? The coexistence of tort, contract, and true products liability
leaves no further need for this misleading and confusing phrase.
Historically, "strict liability" for product injury has had one impor-
tant function: It proclaims that products are important within the
societies, and civil-liability systems, of all industrialized market
economies. Although scholars have not been able to say what
strict liability means,368 the term marks a unique place. As I
have implied throughout this Article, "products liability"-pure
and simple-should claim the title now held by "strict products
liability." The empty reference to strictness ought to be purged,
and the central importance of products reemphasized.
Coexisting with contract and tort, true products liability be-
comes a flexible doctrine that uses the approaches of both tradi-
tions. Wrongful imposition of risk, betrayed expectations, a
breached bargain, careless design, and other concepts of products
367. Beyond tort and contract in the liability system lie compensation schemes of
interest in certain paradigms of nominal products liability. In current American law, com-
pensation schemes govern most vaccine-caused injuries, and other compensation proposals
or plans aim at recompense for other types of injury. See generally Schwartz &
Mahshigian, supra note 297 (discussing vaccine statute and analogous proposals). A long-
standing debate compares the relative merits of liability law and no-fault compensation.
See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CAL L. REv. 555 (1985).
The theory of product dynamism does not resolve this debate. Although it imputes causal
responsibility to products and related responsibility to their makers and users, this ap-
proach does not provide an independent normative basis to translate this agency into
legal liability. Product dynamism may, however, help to explain the persistent appeal of
"wasteful," "costly," even "inefficient" liability. See supra Part II.
368. See supra note 34 (questioning whether strict liability is distinguishable from neg-
ligence); see also note 270 and accompanying text (summarizing confusion about "de-
fect"); note 9 and accompanying text (citing scholarship that favors abolition of products
liability on the ground that the phrase is meaningless).
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liability, which partake of both tort and contract, are concepts that
illuminate cases. Political or distributional goals such as loss
spreading or the manipulation of incentives, however, are separate
from fundamentals of tort and contract 9 and those of true prod-
ucts liability; they would accordingly fall away from products liabil-
ity doctrine. True products liability, then, is a concept stripped not
only of inapposite case paradigms but also political baggage.370
CONCLUSION
Products liability is an interdisciplinary subject. Some of its
intellectual relationships are now universally acknowledged. Eco-
nomic analysts have shed vast light on the doctrine, instructing
judges, citizens, students, scholars and politicians about such funda-
mentals as cost internalization, risk shifting and spreading, incen-
tives to safety, and the insurance aspects of civil liability. Another
discipline important to products liability is history: The place of
products liability in the history of ideas is now fixed.37' As is in-
creasingly plain, the subject is also political. Observers of Ameri-
can politics now understand products liability as an occasion of
political crisis and reform,a 2 and a lens through which to view
369. See generally Weinrib, supra note 17 (criticizing the attempt of American liability
law to achieve distributional goals). But see Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward
a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE LJ. 1055, 1081 (1972) ("One cannot write
off distributional considerations based on ability to spread, or on wealth or caste... with
a reference to Aristotle and a comment that taxation is for legislatures and not for
courts.").
370. Having just nodded to the Kantian-utilitarian debate in tort theory, I move to a
second division here, equally cursorily. What is "political"? According to Professor
Horwitz, for instance, hostility toward "authority for redistribution in torts" such as mine
is a late nineteenth-century phenomenon-itself never justified, and plainly political.
HoRwrrz, CRISIs, supra note 71, at 13. The scholarly battle between formalists (or
"principlists") and critical theorists on the politics of liability is too voluminous to cite;
this article, closer to the former camp, can only refer in passing to the contrary critical
tradition.
371. For distinguished examples of intellectual history within products liability scholar-
ship, see LEVI, supra note 74, at 8-27; Priest, supra note 78, at 461-527.
372. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Taking Advantage of the Torts Crisis, 48 OHIO ST.
LIJ. 329, 333-38 (1987) (summarizing the evolution of a "crisis mentality" inv6lving tort




American political institutions such as the civil jury,373 federal-
ism,374 and interest-group lawmaking."
Interdisciplinary inquiry must now proceed so that products
liability will confront the sociology, philosophy and political theory
that inhere in the doctrine. These disciplines carry products liabili-
ty beyond torts and contracts into another area of the curricu-
lum-property. As I have argued, property law contains a law of
detrimental objects as well as law of beneficial holdings such as
land and heirlooms. When understood as part of the law of detri-
mental objects, products liability is newly connected to venerable
common law concepts-forfeiture, deodands, liability for ani-
mals-as well as the important civil law concept of fait de la chose.
These intellectual connections enhance the concept of products
liability and explain, indirectly, the persistence of a separate legal
category for product-caused injury, going beyond tort and contract.
At the center of this new understanding is the power and
autonomy of the product in society. A product is a community-
created matrix.376 Without a human culture to live in, a product
cannot exist. Yet it is equally true, per Hegel, Marx, and others,
that without products human culture as we recognize it could not
exist. Products help to form our selves; products order the lives of
human beings long before human beings order the law of products
liability.
Observers have tried to explain products liability by reference
to one conscious human goal, which might be maximization of
wealth, a taste for legal labels, conceptions of distributive justice,
or political power, and in these explanations the product itself
vanishes. Within culture, however, the product is vitally important
and not subordinate to goals. It expresses an array of human wish-
373. See JOANNE DOROSHOW, THE CASE FOR THE CIVIL JURY: SAFEGUARDING A
PILLAR OF DEMOCRACY 15-19 (1992) (describing the importance of major products liabil-
ity cases that reached juries).
374. See Blum, supra note 251; Harvey S. Perlman, Products Liability Reform in Con-
gress: An Issue of Federalism, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 503 (1987); Marshall S. Shapo, Making a
"Federal Case" Out of a Tort Reform, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 22, 1995, at 21.
375. See Linda Lipsen, The Evolution of Products Liability as a Federal Policy Issue,
in TORT LAW, supra note 229, at 247, 248; Abel, supra note 14, at 447.
376. I thank my colleague Linda Hirshman for coining this phrase. See also Michael
P. Mokwa, Ethical Consciousness and the Competence of Product Management: Beyond
Righteousness, Rituals, and Rules, in PHILOSOPHICAL AND RADICAL THOUGHT IN MAR-
KETING, supra note 90, at 57, 71 ("Every product is a complex of aspirations, expecta-
tions, experiences, expressions, and ethics.").
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es, impulses and tendencies. Too limber for the Procrustean beds
that commentators build, products liability continually reasserts its
autonomy.
Once acknowledged to be an independent doctrine, products
liability can enlighten and provoke. The old dichotomies of instru-
mentation versus noninstrumentalism, solicitude for business versus
solicitude for consumers, tort approaches versus warranty ap-
proaches, or safety versus innovation are broken open. Products
liability invites lawmakers and observers to think about material
culture, symbolism, history, the process of manufacture, preferenc-
es, personhood, continuity of memory over time, the daily life of a
worker, and the bombardment of life all around us.
